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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are composed of physical and software components. Em-
bedded controllers and logic switches control a physical process using feedback loops and
actuators. Controllers sense the status of physical components through sensors and then
further drive the physical components according to their implementation logic. The eco-
nomic and technological potential of CPS have lead to their their prevalence in the modern
era. Some examples of such systems are - modern medical devices, assisted living systems,
automobiles, aircrafts, automated manufacturing units etc. Emergence of Model-Based
Design (MBD) methodologies and tools has provided accelerated and effective ways of
modeling complex CPS. Therefore, MBD has become predominant in CPS development.
MBD Engineers develop graphical domain models of CPS using Domain-Specific Mod-
eling Languages that are rich in their knowledge of a specific domain of concern. Model
translators and code generators are the workhorses of MBD which facilitate automated
transformations of developed models resulting in cost effective and less time consuming
development life cycle of CPS. Such translators can generate target models for simulations
or target program to run on actual embedded controllers in CPS.
As discussed by Lee [55], CPS like automobiles, medical devices, etc... are required to
strictly adhere to their safety specifications to avoid hazards, and hence, are safety-critical.
Failures of such systems can lead to physical inconvenience and monetary losses on one
hand and even catastrophic disasters on the other. Thus, mitigation of bugs in systems is
desired and hence, verification of developed system designs has recently been emphasized
by research communities and industry both.
The verification of systems during development cycles incurs major costs and time but
currently lacks formal approaches. Therefore, formal methods for verification are recently
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sought by researchers. Model checking is a formal approach to verification where the
behavioral state space of a system is exhaustively explored to find undesired states in the
behavior. This leads to full-coverage analysis of the behavior of a system.
In MBD, the controller models can be verified using formal verification methods dur-
ing the initial modeling phase, but finally the end products (for example, generated code)
remain the artifacts from these models that get deployed and executed in safety-critical
CPS. Application of the untrusted code-generators or translators components to generate
the deployable artifacts remain the points of concern. Their use may lead to injection of
errors in the translated target models or programs (for example, a faulty translator might
introduce new states in the behavioral state-space of the translated models or programs),
thus, invalidating their equivalence or consistency with the source models. Such errors
may lead to undesired behavior in the translated artifacts and their deployment to a com-
promise with safety. Therefore, it remains beneficial to develop trust on the translation
using automated tools and checking whether they preserve the functional behavior during
the translations. The complexity of the translator tools are analogous to compliers and
makes their verification a hard problem. Moreover, the generated code is not generally
intended to be human-readable, but only optimized for execution and easy for automated
deployment, which makes their manual verification more tedious and avoids the advantages
of MBD. This thesis addresses this issue in safety-critical CPS and focuses on implement-
ing and integrating extensions to MBD tools to provide an automated workflow to develop
trust on translation by code-generators and their generated software.
I.1 Motivation
A Domain Specific Modeling Language (DSML) named ”Cyber-Physical Systems Model-
ing Language” (CyPhyML) [53], developed using a MBD tool GME (Generic Modeling
Environment), is an element of the DARPA AVM META project which is targeted at design
and development of heterogeneous CPS that are particularly military ground vehicles. The
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Cyber components in CyPhyML, representing digital controllers implemented as embed-
ded software, are based upon ESMoL DSML [52], [59]. The Cyber components can be
modeled in Simulink (MATLAB) and imported for use in CyPhyML. Model translators are
the workhorse of MBD tools, and play a central role in synthesizing transformed models
and code for deployment. Stateflow model transformers and interpreter tools are used auto-
matically import Simulink Stateflow models to CyPhyML domain and generate C code for
deployment of the controller components, respectively. The transformed ESMoL models
(Cyber models) and their generated deployment code must conform to certain behavioral
specifications for the purpose of safety and desired functional behaviors.
Modeling, design and development of CPS are error-prone. Unavailability of important
design details during the initial phases of development, usage of multiple third-party tools
during the development life-cycle and utilization of automated code generators and transla-
tors remain few of the several sources responsible for introduction of errors into the target
designs and code. Errors might get introduced in behavior of the generated code for com-
ponents due to faulty code generation or faulty design of a component. The need to find
potential errors in designs introduced during model transformations and code generation
motivates this research.
High complexity of the code-generators that are involved in MBD of large CPS ren-
ders their manual verification impractical. Current development processes lack precise
integration of state-of-the-art verification tools that are capable of formally verifying large
systems. As a result, validation remains confined to procedures like peer review and test-
ing by simulation [16]. Peer review has been really efficient in recognizing bugs during
development where expertise of senior engineers aid a lot. Testing refers to the verification
technique where data from a system is analyzed after actually executing the system with
pre-defined test inputs and then comparing with the correct anticipated outputs. But these
techniques do not provide the type of exhaustive coverage of functional behavior of a sys-
tem which is necessary for analyzing safety-related properties. In the former approach, the
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developed system models are manually checked for syntactical and logical errors without
simulating the model designs, while in the latter approach verification remains as good as
the test scenarios that the designs are subjected to. Although, the above procedures can be
automated to certain extent, mostly they are performed manually by humans which makes
it tedious. This arises the need for automated formal verification workflows.
With the development in computing technology and on-going research on verification
tools (for example, CBMC [29], NuSMV [27], SPIN [46], Zing [14]), these tools can now
better handle complex systems with large state spaces. Also, these tools provide counter-
examples to understand the cause for errors. The need to leverage such tools and integrate
them with development tool chains, further adds to our motivation for this research.
Verification of systems and tools require certain expertise in the domain of property
specification (specifically temporal logic). This also motivates a need to provide a conve-
nient way of modeling verification properties to encourage engineers, who lack expertise
with complex temporal formalisms to include verification procedures during model-based
development. Graphical tools for modeling verification properties in an intuitive manner
seem to be a probable solution in these scenarios.
I.2 Research Problem and Proposed Solution
Verification of software in CPS systems is a challenging problem. Model-based design
tools have simplified construction of such software for system designers using higher ab-
stractions. However, they don’t obviate the need for verification. The verification obli-
gation now includes not only correctness of the higher level abstraction, but also the cor-
rectness of the translator that generates the executable software. Verification of complex
model translators in a general sense remains an intractable problem. This thesis purports to
develop a pragmatic approach which attempts to examine the correctness of such untrusted
tools from the limited but tractable perspective of property preservation. A set of verifi-
cation properties (using LTL) are defined which are checked using a model checking tool
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Figure I.1: Conceptual Overview
(NuSMV) to assert the correctness of the (Stateflow) model with respect to the stated prop-
erties. These verification properties are auto-translated to code modules that implement
equivalent observer automata. These code modules are then compiled with auto-generated
code for their associated component of the system. The compiled program remains suitable
for verification. To verify the correctness of behavior of the generated code with respect
to the same set of properties which are initially checked with NuSMV, the compiled pro-
gram is then model-checked using a source code verification tool (CBMC). The approach
is packaged and delivered as a model-based toolchain for CyPhyML DSML and is named
Verification Tool Chain (VTC). A conceptual overview of the proposed solution is given in
Fig. I.1. Further, Fig. I.2 presents an abstract version of the proposed verification workflow
for verifying the Cyber components’ behavior and developing trust in the code-generator
tools that are associated with the CyPhyML DSML.
Figure I.3 presents the proposed implementation needed to pragmatically realize the
workflow shown in Fig. I.2. A VTC meta-model (or DSML) allows verification prop-
erties to be modeled and linked to relevant CPS components in a TestBench for applying
verification procedure. A TestBench contains a bigger component assembly representing
interconnected models of components. In addition system requirements and validation tests
are defined in the TestBench. These features of the TestBench allow its contained models
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Figure I.2: Proposed Verification Workflow for CyPhyML based CPS development
to be exposed to different types of analyses. In accordance to the proposed solution, a ver-
ification TestBench ultimately contains components models under concern that are linked
with models of verification properties that are developed using the VTC meta-model. The
process of modeling the properties is made convenient for the modeling engineers by using
a pattern-based modeling approach. The VTC meta-model captures natural language-like
patterns for convenience in modeling. Further, the TestBench interpreter tools transform
the pattern-based property models to C code in the context of the linked components. An
existing automated code-generator, which is to be verified, generates C code for the compo-
nent assembly in the TestBench. CBMC is used to apply model checking procedure on the
generated set of C code files. In the case of negative verification results, counterexamples
traces from source C code files are generated for the users.
It should be noted that the translation of models to the NuSMV language for verification
at the model-level is not being done in an automated manner in this work. But, addition of
such an automated tool to VTC in future will be helpful.
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Figure I.3: Proposed implementation of VTC toolset for CyPhyML based CPS develop-
ment in GME
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I.3 Organization of Thesis
The chapters in this thesis are organized as follows. Chapter II contains succinct descrip-
tions of work done by others that is similar to ours. Chapter III contains an introduction
to Cyber-Physical Systems and how model-based design is exploited during their devel-
opment. It contains description of a model-based design tool, named Generic Modeling
Environment (GME). Further, it covers the description of CyPhyML, a modeling paradigm
for Cyber-Physical Systems. Preliminary concepts related to Temporal Logic in addition
to description of other verification tools CBMC and NuSMV, are discussed in the same
chapter as well. Chapter IV presents detailed description of the implementation during the
research. A case-study illustrating application of implemented tools under the research is
presented in Chapter V. Chapter VI contains conclusions and future work.
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CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
Model interpreter tools are backbone of model-based development of systems as they help
in achieving rapid development by automating the development process. But faulty inter-
preter tools can introduce errors in the final product of development. Thus, verification
of untrusted interpreters becomes a major requirement. Owing to their complexity, their
manual verification is intractable and hence different approaches for their verification are
necessary. A fairly good amount of research is done in this direction. [70] describes a veri-
fication technique to prove correctness of a translator. The translator presented in the paper
translates source code written in MicroGypsy (a descendant of Pascal that is used as both
programming and specification language) to target code in Piton (an assembly language).
Two interpreters are used by them, where each interpreter can interpret the semantics of
MicroGypsy and Piton, respectively. The interpreters run the MicroGypsy and Piton pro-
grams to their final states. The information from these final states are compared for their
equivalence. If the information from the final states are equivalent then correctness of trans-
lator is proved, else it is refuted. Though their approach is aimed at verifying correctness of
a translator, they do not make use of formal verification methods or model checking tools.
Hence, no counterexamples in cases of refutation can be generated for debugging purposes,
which remains one of the main benefits of model checking tools.
Though the authors of the paper above performed verification of translator’s behavior
mechanically, Cimatti et al. [28] discuss automated verification of translation tools. They
aim at proving semantic equivalence between generic domain-independent source compu-
tation models (composed of boolean and arithmetic-like operations) and executable target
programs by checking some syntactic properties on target programs. The verifier checks
the target programs against certain precomputed data to prove syntactic property specifica-
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tions. The verifier is embedded – it takes an input model and an output program to perform
automated syntactic verification for the proof of correctness of program generation, and
thus, the program generator. Their motivation comes from the fact that the verifier is em-
bedded into a transportation software development framework where safety is critical.
Necula and Lee [58] present research efforts in the direction of checking correctness
of compilers. This paper deals with compilers which either convert programs from one
source language into another target language or perform optimizations on programs in a
particular programming language. Such compilers can introduce extra faulty states during
optimizations or translations. Therefore, for reliability reasons their proof of correctness is
desired. The paper describes the design and implementation of an optimizing compiler that
translates programs from a strictly typed programming language to an assembly language.
The aim of their design is to ensure the type safety in generated assembly language code
to prove the correctness of optimizing computations performed by the compiler. The paper
points out the importance of such proving techniques by mentioning the application of these
techniques in proving certain behavioral properties of the generated programs as an addi-
tion to their former goal of compiler correctness proofs. Though like us, they are interested
in verifying translators, their focus remain on verifying only syntactical properties while
we are trying to show equivalence between behavioral logic of source models and synthe-
sized target code. Karsai and Narayanan [50] present a tractable verification approach to
provide certificates based on certain desired properties for assurances on the transformed
models generated by automated model transformers in model-based design. They show
their Goal-directed Certification technique on transformations between source StateChart
[43] models and target Extended Hierarchical Automata (EHA) [57] models. They use a
variant of the Bisimulation technique [16] along with Semantic Anchoring [25] to check
equivalence between functional behavior of the source and the target models. Reachability
analysis on EHA models for the desired safety properties is used to validate the transfor-
mation. Semantic anchoring allows them to check models of even those formalisms which
10
include instantaneous state transitions (i.e. multiple transitions in a single macro time step).
They do mention their approach to be not providing a complete proof of correctness of the
transformation, but claim their technique useful for practical verification purposes to in-
crease trust on the transformed models. Use of the Bisimulation technique as opposed to
model checking approach in our work and their focus on validating transformed models
rather than generated deployable code are the key points that differentiate our work from
theirs.
Property prover tools for verification can have applications other than proving correct-
ness of a translator. An interesting idea of an application of such verification tools is pre-
sented by Zaremski and Wing [72]. They introduce a specification matching approach
for different components to facilitate automated retrieval and reuse of similar components.
They essentially show their specification matching approach for function modules. They
compare the signatures of two function modules to derive a syntactic match between them.
In addition to syntactic matching, they include semantic matching using assertion-based
specifications on pre-conditions and post-conditions of the function modules under test.
These specifications are matched using a specification prover tool. The main difference
between their work and our proposed solution is that they use verification approach to en-
able retrieval or reuse of desired function modules from a library of functions rather than
to verify any translator tool. The other difference lies in the fact that we use LTL to model
our specifications while they use assertion based refutation of properties on preconditions
and postconditions of function modules.
LTL formulae can be represented by equivalent Bu¨chi Automata (BA), a type of ω-
automata that accept infinite input sequence. These automata can be used for integration
with program code to be tested. The work presented by Giannakopoulou and Havelund [40]
shows implementation of a tool named Trace Analyzer (TaZ) that converts LTL formula
to a BA. They use the converted BA as observer automata to analyze Java programs by
integrating them with Java PathExplorer (JPaX) [44] (a tool for monitoring Java programs).
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JPaX is used by them to pass the output of Java programs as input sequence to BA for
enabling on-the-fly verification of Java programs. In our proposed solution in this thesis,
we also aim at using Transition-based Generalized Bu¨chi Automata (TGBA) (which is
a variant of BA) as observer automata that are integrated as monitoring automata with
synthesized C code of CPS controller models. Hence, their application of LTL equivalent
automata is closely related to our proposed implementation.
The approach discussed in the paper above of converting LTL formula to an equiva-
lent automaton is adapted with a variation in the work done by Staats and Heimdahl [64].
They verify the correctness of untrusted translation tools used in model based develop-
ment of systems. In their verification technique, initially, verification of modeled designs
of systems is performed with the NuSMV [27] model checker before synthesizing code.
Then verification on synthesized code with CBMC is performed to prove the correctness of
translators that are used for code synthesis. They postulate that if some critical properties
can be proved to hold true, before and after translations, then it can suggest increased trust
in the translation tool. They use TGBA as the equivalent automaton for an LTL formula
and translate it automatically to C code monitors. To enable verification, these monitors
are integrated as observing monitors with the synthesized code from system models. The
monitors are augmented as user-given assertions that can suggest violation of a temporal
property and can be checked for violation by reachability analysis with CBMC. Results
from verification with NuSMV and CBMC are compared to prove correctness of transla-
tors. They present experimental results to prove correctness of two code generation tools
that are used to synthesize C code for Simulink models. One of the tools is the Real-Time
Workshop C code generator and the other is a C code generator that was being developed
by Rockwell Collins Inc. Their technique is conceptually very similar to ours, but unlike
them we have integrated our verification approach with a model-based design tool GME
(Generic Modeling Environment [54]) by developing domain-specific model interpreter
tools for enabling convenient and automated verification procedures.
12
Now we discuss some recent related work where people have presented application
and usage of existing model checking tools within model based development techniques
for systems. The research work of Heitmeyer [45] discusses a Software Cost Reduction
(SCR) workflow for development of Software systems. They focus on verification of large
systems using the benefits of composition of systems and reuse of existing components
through model-based engineering. They have presented a specification analysis approach
for abstract system models and they use the TAME theorem prover for model checking the
abstract models. After every phase of their engineering development cycle they validate
the translation of models based on critical specification properties which are modeled using
temporal logic. Their ultimate goal is to achieve high trust in the model constructs so that
the code synthesized from them is ’correct by construction’. They present examples of
avionics software, submarine’s monitoring software and a software to process data from
different memory partitions to support their research methodology. Though they suggest
that high-level trust on synthesized code can be obtained by formal validation of the abstract
model designs before code synthesis, they do not elaborate on the possibility of faulty code
generators.
The recent research presented by Wang [68] focuses on analyzing correctness of be-
havioral propagation in C code generated for Simulink models. They use an open-source C
code translator for Simulink models, named GENE-AUTO (GA). In their technique, behav-
ioral analysis is facilitated by augmenting stability proof annotations in the Simulink mod-
els. These augmentations are implemented using blocks from Simulink that are provided
in a block library. The stability proofs represent the pre-conditions and post-conditions of
Simulink blocks. These proofs are converted to a library of annotation block backends for
GA model representations of Simulink models. These annotation block backends are then
converted to ACSL (a language to specify properties for C code formally) specification an-
notations in generated C code. Formal verification tools like Farma-C, that support ACSL,
enable verification of properties (specified using ACSL) on generated C code for Simulink
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blocks. This approach appears similar to our proposed solution and utilizes model-based
approach for automated behavioral verification of code generated from system models.
But, they do not explicitly relate their work to correctness of model translators or code
generators and they do not use LTL for specifying the verification properties.
Though increasing use of state-of-the-art model checking tools is making verification
of models more conveniently approachable, however, verification properties still need to
be specified by engineers which requires certain expertise with concepts like LTL. Lack of
such expertise makes it inconvenient for the engineers to correctly specify the properties
. For these reasons, convenient specification modeling approaches are presented in sev-
eral research works. The work presented by Bryant [22] discusses conversion of natural
language-like function specifications to object-oriented structures for their easy integration
with development processes. The predicates of the functions can be specified in a natural
language-like format with domain-specific information for the variables used by functions.
The definitions of functions should comply with the rules of two context grammars. The
context grammars are derived using a Two-Level Grammar (TLG) and they conform to the
domain for development. The Specification Development Environment (SDE) tool facili-
tates specifying natural language-like definitions of functions and parses the definitions to
convert them to object-oriented designs. The tool requires sufficient user-interaction for
improvising the definitions which are partially defined. They do not use their technique
to model temporal properties exactly, but we get inspired from their work to implement
easy-to-use natural language-like approach for specifying verification properties.
The work by Dwyer et al. [36], [37] presents usage of English-like patterns to define
temporal properties for a system and is explicitly focused on convenient modeling of tem-
poral properties. Usage of such patterns frees engineers from needing great expertise with
temporal logic formalisms. They have categorized the patterns into behavior patterns (eg.
Occurrence, Absence, Response) which define the specific behavior that a property sig-
nifies about the system. To define the moments during the execution of a system where
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the behavior defined by a temporal property holds true, they provide scope patterns (eg.
After, Before, Until, Always). Boundaries for a scope pattern can be defined with events
that represent state of a system. They have specified mappings between combinations of
English-like behavior and scope patterns for a property and LTL formulae. Such mappings
can be used for automated conversion of pattern-based properties to LTL formulae. They
collectively call it Specification Pattern System (SPS) and claim its usefulness in model-
ing numerous critical temporal properties over systems that are being used in the industry.
Salamah et al. [61] extend SPS to develop Property Specification Tool (Prospec) that allows
composition of SPS patterns for defining sequential and concurrent behavior of a system.
PROPEL, for ”PROPerty ELucidation”, is another tool presented by Smith et al. [62]
which makes use of templates to model properties. They present three types of useful tem-
plates - Finite State Automata Templates (FSA), Disciplined Natural Language Templates
(DNL), Decision Tree Templates (DT). FSA and DNL provide an intuitive automata-based
modeling approach to decide and model behavior for a temporal property over some set
of constituent variables and events of a system. FSA and DNL can be used in parallel for
modeling a property as they contain analogous options for intuitive modeling of properties.
DT, on the other hand, uses SPS-like patterns to define the desired behavior for a property.
For better assessment of the properties that are modeled in PROPEL, semantically equiva-
lent DNL paragraphs and timeline graph representations are presented to the end-users that
help them refine their models for the properties.
A recent work by Wagner [67] presents a modeling and verification tool CertaAMOR
that combines a pattern-based approach for modeling of requirements specification for sys-
tems with automated iterative verification procedures. The author discusses a microwave
system example that is developed using SpecDSL and constitutes temporal properties em-
bedded in the system model. The author further mentions the Requirements Analysis Tool
(RAT), developed at Fondazione Bruno Kessler in the EU, which facilitates automated veri-
fication of specification properties. The usage of a convenient pattern-based property mod-
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eling tool is closely related to the property modeling approach in our proposed solution for
verification. The model-augmented English language-like requirements can be propagated
to later stages in development life-cycle in an automated fashion using the CertaAMOR
tool, however, the approach doesn’t include translation of abstract models to deployable
code.
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CHAPTER III
BACKGROUND
In this chapter, explanations for concepts of verification, meta-modeling in model based
designs and tools used in the work are discussed with their strengths, limitations and major
features.
III.1 Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and CPS research challenges
CPS[55] are complex systems with controllers monitoring and controlling physical pro-
cesses. With the changes in the states of a physical process the controllers perform com-
putations to change states and guide the execution of the physical process. Developments
in networking, monitoring, computational systems etc... are leading to more complex CPS
which have begun to solve major engineering issues in present world. Some complex en-
gineering problems where CPS has helped are described in [42] and [26] which mention a
CPS for tracking a bio-medical weapon and a medical CPS in intensive care units of hospi-
tals, respectively. Figure III.1 shows how a generic CPS model appears. In the figure it can
be seen that a controller takes output from a physical component as its input, which forms
a feedback loop, and via a controlling link it provides input to the physical system which
increasingly and dynamically might change the behavior of the physical component.
There are many design challenges currently in the field of CPS. Due to their use in
safety-critical scenarios, verification and validation of CPS is a major requirement for
quality assurance which is also realized in [42] and [26]. The other research challenges
in CPS are - (1) Modeling logical compositions of heterogeneous components: CPS can be
composed of multiple components having different behaviors and formalisms. This makes
the composition of these different components in CPS [66] models a big concern due to
the incompatibility in their semantics. (2) Distributed Architecture of CPS: Benefits like
concurrency and distributed computation facilities development of CPS as a distributed ar-
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Figure III.1: CPS generic model.
chitecture. Solutions to the above challenges often include developing complex reactive
and networking systems which further increases risk for infusion of faults in their models
that can cause serious troubles during execution of such systems. These factors further
emphasize need of rigorous verification and validation of CPS.
III.2 Model-Based Design of CPS
In this section we shall discuss the current practices in model based designing of CPS and
why verification is required under these practices. Owing to the complexity of CPS and
emergence of a variety of computer based design tools (AutoCAD [1], Simulink [8] etc.),
model-based design of CPS has become an effective practice that helps in rapid develop-
ment of the CPS and makes it more productive. Meta-models are paradigms in model based
designs which capture the specifications of a domain for development - in this case CPS.
They capture the properties of individual types of sub-components in a system belonging
to a particular domain, pertaining to the communication between types, interconnections
among them, data and control flow through them etc. Further they capture the contain-
ment and connection relationships among different types of components in a domain, thus,
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Figure III.2: CPS development using Model-Based Designs
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providing a hierarchical structure realization of the systems that need to be developed. By
embedding constraints on relationship mappings in the meta-models it can be ensured that
developed domain models strictly adhere to certain relational mapping specifications and
comply with a set of domain specific rules. The graphical user interfaces provided with
the model-based design tools help engineers to construct a model of a particular system
in hierarchical manner and visualize it in terms of the relational rules of the domain that
the system belongs to. The model-based tools not only provide graphical and logical vi-
sualization of systems, but also provide additional tools that may facilitate their analysis
and deployment. Additional integrated tools use the advantage of accessing meta informa-
tion of the domain that developed model belongs to, which allows them to understand a
particular domain so as to perform analysis and deployment tasks according to it. Figure
III.2 depicts the flow of model-based development of CPS. This approach of modeling of
systems is referred to as Model Integrated Computing (MIC) (for more details refer to [65]
and [49]). Hence, the steps in model-based design can be summarized (as in Fig. III.3) as
follows:
1. Domain Analysis and Meta Modeling: During this step, the domain under consider-
ation is analyzed so as to construct the meta-models that capture the rules and speci-
fications of the domain to which the target domain models should adhere to. This is
similar to requirements analysis in software engineering with a subtle difference that
requirements here are set of specifications for a particular domain of interest.
2. Target domain model development: Using meta-models, target domain models of
particular systems are developed which depict the physical or computational behavior
of components within a system in addition to connections and relationships among
them. The goal here is always to ensure the production of models that represent the
mappings of components of a system analogous to the real system.
3. Development of Model Interpreters: During this step, additional tools are developed
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Figure III.3: Steps in Model-Based Design. (Obtained from [65])
which refer to the meta models developed in the first step and take the models gen-
erated in the second step as inputs to perform certain tasks on them. The tasks can
include certain types of analysis, augmentation of specifications, transformations of
models for simulations, verification, deployment etc.
Lee et al. [47] discuss a CPS - the Tunneling Ball Device [48] as a case study and
provide detailed steps of model-based design of the device by realizing it as a centralized
system (as opposed to distributed system) composed of continuous system components de-
picting kinematics of a free ball, rotating disc and a DC motor. They use PTIDES [34] as
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the model of computation for the Tunelling Ball Device, which is derived by specifying
timing constraints on sensor networks and thus extending discrete-event DE [39] seman-
tics. They use simulation tools - Ptolemy [38] and LabView [4]. Ptolemy is a framework
for modeling heterogeneous CPS using a variety of Models of Computation (MoCs) where
the input and output behaviors of the components are defined by specifications of an MoC.
Brooks et al. [21] study advantages and pitfalls of using different MoCs in model-based
design using a Traffic Light example. Balasubramanian et al. [17] emphasize on the advan-
tages of mode-based design over ad-hoc methods for system integration and composition
using reusable component designs by discussing the application of model-based design to
develop Embedded Automotive Applications.
III.3 Generic Modeling Environment (GME)
GME [54] is a modeling tool to develop DSMLs (Domain Specific Modeling Languages)
and their respective target domain system models. The development method for system
modeling in GME follows the MIC approach. Post-requirements analysis of a domain,
UML (Unified Modeling Language) [10] - based meta-models are developed in GME that
represent a DSML for the domain. The graphical interface and UML-based approach to
construct meta-models make later revision phases of a DSML convenient. GME provides
a design language - MetaGME, which is a set of classes that are used to develop meta-
models for DSMLs. Figure III.4 and Table III.1 show a simple example of a meta-model
developed using MetaGME and semantics of the MetaGME classes, respectively. The de-
veloped meta-models are used to then develop system models within the context of the
specified DSML. GME allows for checking syntactical correctness of models, by checking
them against constraints modeled in OCL (Object Constraint Language [6]). Often during
the final stages of development life cycle analysis and deployment facilities are necessary.
For these purposes additional toolsets including code generators and model transformers
are developed within the context of the specified DSML’s meta-model. Association of
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Figure III.4: UML-based Meta-model Example using MetaGME
MetaGME Class Usage in Meta-model development
<<Model>> A class that can have further contained classes
<<Atom>> A class that cannot have further contained classes
<<Connection>> An association class for a connector (displayed as • icon) that represents interconnection
between two classes
<<Reference>> A class whose object, in a meta-model’s domain model, can point to an object of another
class (and its derived classes). Note: 4 is the display icon for inheritance in MetaGME.
<<ModelProxy>> A copy of another <<Model>>class (semantically equivalent). Note: Usage is analo-
gous for other <<...Proxy>>classes.
Table III.1: Overview of MetaGME Classes
tools with a particular DSML of interest makes them more intelligent for use within the
context of the DSML. Development of such extension tools for GME requires generation
of a domain-specific C++ or CSharp API for the class types that are defined in the DSML’s
meta-model. GME facilitates automated generation of these APIs, which contain Object-
oriented classes [11], using UDM (Unified Data Modeling Framework [56]). These APIs
allow engineers to develop the extension tools that can operate on input models developed
using a DSML meta-model, and traverse the input models’ hierarchy to further transform
the input models for further analysis, simulation and code generation.
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Figure III.5: Abstract CPS design in CyPhyML
III.4 CyPhyML: An MIC paradigm for CPS
The Cyber-Physical Systems Modeling Language (CyPhyML) [53] is a DSML for model-
ing heterogeneous CPS. It is a unified modeling framework to model behaviors of heteroge-
neous components of a CPS while allowing logical interconnections among them to define
designs. Owing to different behaviors of components in a heterogeneous CPS, it becomes
hard to define semantics for the interconnections between different components. It is de-
veloped under the META project of the DARPA AVM research effort to aid in development
of next generation autonomous military vehicles.
To realize complex heterogeneous CPS, their physical and controller component mod-
els need to be composed together. The physical components (continuous), which may be
acausal [69], can be modeled as Modelica [5]-based models; the controllers, which are
causal, can be modeled as Stateflows (discrete) using Simulink [8]. Acausal connections
between components are consistent with the idea that the composition of physical systems
implies a simultaneous and instantaneous sharing of the physical states between composed
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components. Causal connections are consistent with the composition of digital systems -
each causal signal interface is either an ’input’ or ’output’, and the interconnections im-
ply dependency between components as well as a separation in their time of occurrence of
events in each component. The state information of physical components is fed into con-
trollers to drive their discrete logic which in turn control the continuous dynamic behav-
ior of the physical components. But, composition of continuous and discrete components
poses issues related to semantics of the composition as the components may share variables
across boundaries. The composed systems are referred as Hybrid System [15] having both
discrete and continuous states. CyPhyML facilitates meaningful composition of multi-
domain CPS components in designs and the synthesis of simulation models to evaluate
those designs. CyPhyML components are specified as wrappers encapsulating more spe-
cific model behavior. For example, the dynamic behavior of a vehicle component may be
specified as a Modelica model. To use that model compositionally in a design, CyPhyML
requires a reference to the detailed Modelica model and allows the modeler to specify an
interface with strongly-typed ports that define how the component can be composed with
compatible components to form a design. Careful attention to the semantics of those inter-
faces and connections allows the final design to be well-formed and ultimately represent a
valid simulation. CyPhyML provides variety of interface ports for the wrapper components.
Signal ports, power ports and mechanical ports are few among those types. These inter-
face ports are internally connected to the Stateflow or Modelica model contained inside the
wrapper component. To compose compatible components the interface ports are externally
connected. These interconnection types must be specified in the CyPhyML meta-model.
Certain complex context-specific rules for valid interconnections are also modeled as Ob-
ject Constraint Language (OCL)-based constraints. Interconnection between signal ports
are responsible for propagating data and control signals between physical and controller
components. For mechanical and power-based interconnections mechanical and power
ports can be used. The composed models can be simulated by associating them with Test
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Bench [71] models in CyPhyML. The domain-specific model interpreter tools are applied
on the TestBench models to generate code or transformed models for simulation and anal-
ysis. Figure III.5 shows a controller and a physical system modeled which are imported
into the CyPhyML modeling environment. Both the models in the figure are shown to
be encapsulated by Component wrapper blocks and are interconnected through different
interface ports of the wrapper blocks. The controller sends and receives data and control
signals to the physical system via signal ports labeled as ’S’ on blocks ’A’ and ’B’, while
the physical system is getting its power from block ’D’ via power interface port of block
’B’ and is maintaining a mechanical connection with block ’C’ via mechanical interface
port of block ’B’.
The CyPhyML meta-model is designed using GME. Figure III.6.1 shows that a ’Com-
ponentType’ object can contain a ’SignalFlowModel’ and/or ’ModelicaModel’ objects. In
CyPhyML - a ’SignalPort’ object can be an interface port contained inside a ’Compo-
nentType’ object, a ’IO Signal’ object can be contained as an interface port inside a ’Sig-
nalFlowModel’ object, a ’ModelicaSignalPort’ object can be contained as an interface port
inside a ’ModelicaModel’ object. Figure III.6.2 shows how ’SignalPort’ type ports can
be internally connected to ’IO Signal’ and ’ModelicaSignalPort’ type ports via ’Signal-
PortMap’ type connections to enable meaningful composition of heterogeneous ’Mod-
elicaModel’ and ’SignalFlowModel’ type components. While composing heterogeneous
components in CyPhyML, ’SignalPort’ type ports of different Component wrapper blocks
can be connected via ’InformationFlow’ type connections, as can be deduced from Fig.
III.6.3 and Fig. III.6.4. Figure III.7 shows composition of heterogeneous components
in a vehicle using CyPhyML - a transmission assembly (named ’TransmissionExtended-
GenericV2’), containing a Modelica model with continuous behavior and is controlled by
the transmission controller (named ’TransmissionControllerv2’), containing a StateFlow
model that follows discrete semantics. The controller determines the current gear state
for the transmission assembly based upon its RPM (Rotation Per Minute) values. All sig-
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Figure III.6: Subsets of the CyPhyML meta-model
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nals for transmission gears from ’TransmissionExtendedGenericV2’ to ’TransmissionCon-
trollerv2’ are modeled as ’InformationFlow’ type connections, thus, enabling heteroge-
neous composition of both components that have ’SignalPort’ type (strongly typed) inter-
face ports. Figure III.7 also shows how the ’SignalPort’ type ports (’Gear1’ to ’Gear6’) of
’TransmissionControllerv2’ (wrapper component), are internally connected to ’IO Signal’
type ports of ’ControllerContainer’ (a ’SignalFlowModel’ following Stateflow semantics)
to enable heterogeneous composition.
III.5 Cyber components in CyPhyML
To model the behavior of the cyber components, ESMoL (Embedded Systems Modeling
Language) [52], [59] paradigm is adapted in CyPhyML. ESMoL is a DSML to enable mod-
eling of embedded systems and generating simulations for them. Its major purpose lies
in adding distributed deployment capability to Simulink models for platform-specific dis-
tributed architectures and enabling their scheduling analysis. ’MDL2MGA’ is an ESMoL-
specific interpreter tool that converts Simulink models to CyPhyML-specific cyber-domain
models which. ’SignalFlowModel’ in CyPhyML (refer to Fig. III.6 and Fig. III.7) are
the encapsulating wrapper interfaces for the converted models. Strongly typed interface
ports of ’SignalFlowModel’ enable composition of the converted Simulink models with
other physical components in CyPhyML. For simulation purposes, a C code API is gener-
ated for the cyber components in CyPhyML using ’CyPhy2SLC CodeGen’ interpreter tool.
CyPhy2SLC CodeGen is an upgraded and CyPhyML-compatible version of the interpreter
tool developed under the research work for ESMoL that was used to generate the C code
API for Simulink/Stateflow models in ESMoL. The steps for synthesis and code genera-
tion for CyPhyML cyber components are given in Fig. III.8. The two interpreter tools
mentioned in this section are used for performing experiments that are presented in this
thesis.
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Figure III.7: Heterogeneous composition of components in a Vehicle using CyPhyML
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Figure III.8: Tools for synthesis and code generation for CyPhyML cyber components
30
III.6 Temporal Logics and their Automaton equivalents
Requirement for verification of safety-critical CPS is paramount. For the purpose of ver-
ification of CPS, some sort of formalism to specify properties of a system is required.
Numerous state-of-the-art verification tools use temporal logic to specify a system’s prop-
erties. Specific properties of a system over certain state-variables can be specified over
time using temporal logic. Temporal Logic [16], [31], [18] can be of two types - Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) or Computational Tree Logic (CTL). In LTL, the time is assumed to
be linearly increasing during the execution of a system leading to a linear path for time-
based traces, while in CTL, the time can have branching paths leading to a tree structure of
time-based traces. Though the nature of time for a system can be associated with real time,
within the context of verification of systems the notion of time is generally abstract. Hence,
each time step in abstract-time within the context of a specification can be related to, sup-
pose, each sampling cycle of a sensor network, or each computation cycle of a toplevel
system in a CPS etc. In the work presented in this thesis, the LTL formalism is used, and
hence discussed in detail here rather than CTL. In the first subsection LTL is discussed, in
the second subsection equivalent automata for LTL (Bu¨chi Automata) is discussed and in
the third subsection C code representations of LTL formulae are discussed.
III.6.1 Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
LTL is used to specify Linear Time properties of a system. It extends propositional logic
with temporal modalities [16] – that is, atomic propositions of predicate logics can be asso-
ciated with temporal operators to convert predicate logic to LTL. The elementary temporal
operators are given in Table III.2.
Examples: Suppose a1 and a2 are two atomic propositions over boolean variables p
and q, respectively, such that – a1: (p == true), a2: (q == true). Following are examples
of a few properties written as LTL statements:
1. ’now and forever in the future’ a2 must occur ’in the next time step’ after every
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Operator Notation Meaning
G (global) now and forever in the future
F (future) eventually in the future
X (next) in the next time step in the future
U (strong until) until some stop condition in the future
W(weak until) forever or until some stop condition in the future
Table III.2: List of Temporal Operators
occurrence of a1. Using temporal operators the LTL mathematical statement can be
written as: ”G ( a1X a2 )”, where ’’ means ’implies’.
2. if a1 occurs in the very first time step, then in the second time step a2 must occur.
The equivalent LTL statement will be: ”a1X a2”.
3. ’In the future’ if a1 occurs, then in the next time step a2 must occur. The equivalent
LTL statement will be: ”F (a1X a2)”.
4. a1 occurs ’until’ a2. The equivalent LTL statement will be: ”(a1 U a2)”.
5. Occurrence of a1 leads to occurrence of a2 ’in the future’. The equivalent LTL
statement will be: ”(a1F a2)”.
For the purpose of verification of systems the atomic propositions can be formulated
over state variables in a system and specification properties can be written in temporal
logic by associating temporal operators with those atomic propositions. An example of
two processes P1 and P2 is given in Fig. III.9. Here both the processes are trying to obtain
mutually exclusive write access to the memory using semaphores. The semaphore variables
for both the processes are ’writeLock’. For such a scenario there can be specified at least
two temporal properties to ensure sound behavior of the whole system: (1) Both processes
should not get write access to the memory at the same time. (2) After P1 gains access to
write to the memory, P2 should also eventually gain write access, and vice-versa.
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Figure III.9: Two processes writing to a memory
For Fig. III.9, let us assume two atomic propositions A1 and A2 such that - A1:
P1.writeLock == true, A2: P2.writeLock == true. The above stated temporal properties
can be written as follows after applying temporal operators on the conjunction of boolean
atomic propositions A1 and A2:
1. P1.writeLock and P2.writeLock should never be true simultaneously:
”G ( !(A1 & A2 ) )”, where ’!’ and ’&’ are boolean operators for ’NOT’ and ’AND’
respectively.
2. P1.writeLock becoming true should eventually lead to P2.writeLock becoming true
in the future:
”A1F A2”.
There can be two types of temporal properties - safety and liveness [51], [16]. Safety
properties depict that something bad never happens, while Liveness properties mean that
something good eventually happens. In the above example of two processes writing to a
memory, the first property stating that both processes should never simultaneously gain
write access to memory is a good example of a safety property. Verification of this safety
property for the system ensures that a major safety-critical behavior is ensured within the
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system. The second property in the same example stating that one process eventually gains
write access after the other is a good example of a liveness property. Though the second
property doesn’t relate to safe behavior of the system, but it ensures that both the processes
eventually are able to write to the memory.
III.6.2 Bu¨chi Automaton - An Automaton equivalent for LTL
Once properties are available as LTL statements, they must be converted to C-code state-
ments for C-code verification tools. LTL statements are not suitable for such conversions
directly because of the denotational nature of LTL. Hence, using intermediate operational
forms such as automata remain a good choice to facilitate generation of equivalent C-code
statements for LTL statements. Automata traversal logic in interpreter tools may then eas-
ily automate the generation of LTL-equivalent C-code statements for verification purposes.
Automaton equivalents of LTL properties for models that do not represent finite systems
require the automaton to accept infinite input sequences.
A Bu¨chi Automaton (BA) [60] is an infinite input sequence accepting automaton which
can be used to represent LTL properties. Schnieder and Alpern [13] explain how LTL prop-
erties can be represented as a deterministic Bu¨chi Automaton (DBA) and give examples of
DBA representations of temporal specifications for a mutual exclusion protocol. They fur-
ther explain that the states of a BA can present predicates in a temporal logic and hence
an acceptable input sequence of the BA proves satisfiability of the temporal logic that it
represents. A definition for BA is given in Definition 1.
Definition 1 : A Bu¨chi Automaton is a defined as a six-tuple automaton:
A = (S, S0, δ, F, D, L)
where,
S is finite set of states in the automaton,
S0 ⊆ S is a set of initial states,
δ is a set of transition relations depicting S → 2S,
F ⊆ S is a set of acceptance states,
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Figure III.10: Bu¨chi Automaton for LTL formula - G F p
D is a finite domain for inputs,
L : S → 2D is labeling function.
In relation to Definition 1 an acceptable input sequence exists when for an infinite
input sequence over domain D an acceptance state from F is reached infinitely often. The
concept of acceptance states can be understood with an example as in Fig. III.10 which
is a Bu¨chi automaton representation of the LTL property (G F p) depicting - ’p’ occurs
infinitely often. It is a DBA with initial state as ’1’ and an acceptance state as ’2’. It can
be intuitively understood that if ’2’ occurs infinitely often for some input sequence in the
DBA then it satisfies the claimed property of p occurring infinitely often.
Lerda and Giannakopoulou [63] explain an approach to minimize the Bu¨chi Automaton
derived from an LTL formula. For verification purposes, the transition system representa-
tion of a system under test is combined with a BA-equivalent of the LTL property via
Cartesian product. The equivalent BA representations of complex LTL formulae can have
an exponential number of states, thus, increasing the state-space complexity of the final
product automaton to be verified. Thus, minimization of a Bu¨chi Automaton leading to
fewer states in the final product automaton helps in verification owing to its reduced state-
space. The authors claim to generate smaller product automata when minimization of BA is
performed by rewriting LTL formulae according to a set of expansion rules (called tableau
rules) and then applying boolean optimizations over the states generated for BA.
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Figure III.11: Transition-based Generalized Bu¨chi Automaton for LTL formula - G F p
III.6.3 Transition-based Generalized Bu¨chi Automata and its C code equivalent
In this we use another variant of BA, called Transition-based Generalized Bu¨chi Automa-
ton (TGBA) [41], where acceptance conditions are associated with transitions rather than
states. They can be generated with the existing tableau-based methods and potentially gen-
erate much smaller automata than acceptance-state-based BA as suggested in [41]. Figure.
III.11 shows the TGBA equivalent of the BA in Fig. III.10. In the figure, the transitions
with ’{Acc}’ belong to accepting set of transitions. An infinite input sequence for an LTL
formula proves to be satisfiable if infinitely often those transitions are traversed in the cor-
responding TGBA which belong to the accepting set of transitions. In Fig. III.11 if the
accepting transition from state ’1’ to state ’2’ and the accepting self-transition of state ’2’
are traversed infinitely for an infinite input sequence, then it means that ’p’ occurs infinitely
often, hence, satisfying the LTL formula (G F p).
We are interested in automated verification of systems, and hence generate code of
verifiable programmatic wrappers from LTL-formulae-equivalent-TGBA in an automated
manner. To discuss an example of code generation from a TGBA let us consider an LTL
formula ( G ( pX q ) ) denoting – always for every occurrence of ’p’ in the next time step
must occur ’q’, where ’p’ and ’q’ are atomic propositions. Figure III.12 shows the TGBA
and the C code representations of the considered LTL formula. All transitions in the shown
TGBA are acceptance transitions, i.e. satisfiability of the LTL formula proves true if any of
the transitions is traversed for an input sequence. The C code presented is a set of ’if else’
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Figure III.12: C code for Transition-based Generalized Bu¨chi Automaton for LTL formula
- G ( pX q )
statements with conditions encoding the current state status and proposition conditions for
which transition conditions become true. States ’1’ and ’2’ are labeled as ’G (Xq — !p)’
and ’q & G(Xq — !p)’, respectively.
For verification purposes the generated C-code is utilized by code verification tools.
For an input sequence to the TGBA, a violation of LTL formula is concluded if none of the
accepting transitions in Fig. III.12 are traversed for the input sequence. ’Assert’ statements
are included to the set of ’if else’ statements as given in Fig. III.13 to indicate violations of
the property. If a verification tool reaches the ’assert’ statement during its applied verifica-
tion procedure then a violation is concluded. Features of TGBA, like smaller compact final
automata and convenient code representations and generation, motivates their usage in this
work.
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Figure III.13: C code for Transition-based Generalized Bu¨chi Automaton for LTL formula
- G ( pX q ) with Assert statements
III.7 Model Checking using LTL
For verification of safety-critical CPS, formal methods are currently recommended by re-
searchers. Model Checking is a formal method of verification where exhaustive state-space
explorations is performed automatically on the source CPS models to check whether they
satisfy certain verification properties. To perform model checking, a transition system for
the system under test is modeled and is multiplied with an automaton equivalent to the
negated LTL formula of a property (property representing ’bad behavior’). The derived
product automaton is subjected to model checking tools like CBMC, NuSMV which ap-
ply decision procedures to check if in the product automaton a bad state can be reached.
In cases of unsatisfiability (when a bad state is reachable), a counterexample trace in the
source model is provided for debugging purposes. The model checking approach is shown
in Fig. III.14.
III.8 CBMC - A Symbolic C-code Bounded Model Checker
As explained in Section III.7, model checking for verification of systems requires genera-
tion of the product of a transition system representing the behavior of system under test and
an automaton equivalent of LTL property that is needed to be checked. The generated prod-
uct automaton is provided as an input to model checking tools to perform their verification.
The state-of-the-art model checkers represent the state-spaces of provided input automata
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Figure III.14: Model Checking Approach
using Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) [23] or Boolean Encodings (SAT) [20], [19], [24]
to enable application of verification procedures on them. BDD uses explicit representations
of states in a state-space. The explicit state-space representations make use of canonical
forms which make the representations bulky. Additionally, requirements for computation
of variable ordering in BDDs exacerbates the problem of state-space explosion. For this
reason, model checking techniques using BDDs can not handle very large state-spaces
(that include around 1020 states). As a result verification problems for BDD-represented
state-spaces become intractable. To counter this, symbolic model checking tools make use
of propositional formulae to represent states in the state-spaces using boolean encodings.
This enables them to handle very large state-spaces too [24].
CBMC [29], [30], [9] is a symbolic model checker that can be used to verify ANSI-C
programs. It facilitates checks on pointers, bounds on arrays, type safety in addition to user
specified assertions. It converts a specification property and the behavioral state-space of a
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Figure III.15: CBMC Loop Unwinding Approach
C-program, that is an implementation of a system in C language, into set of propositional
formulae, that are in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF), to apply satisfiability checks on
them. CBMC converts an input C-program into a goto binary file with extension ’.exe’.
The generated goto-binary is not executable, but essentially a control flow graph of the
C-program comprising of if, else and goto functions. As suggested by CBMC’s name, it
performs bounded model checking on a given C-program. Bounded model checking with
bound of ’k’ means that symbolic model checking is performed till an execution depth of
’k’. CBMC achieves this by the approach of ’loop unwinding’. For an example of loop
unwinding, consider Fig. III.15 where a while loop is converted into a set of three if else
statements for a bound of ’k=3’ in CBMC. With a given bound ’k’ CBMC unwinds the
loop structures till the specified bound to generate the corresponding set of propositional
formulae for the given C-program.
Suppose the set of propositional CNF formulae for a C-program to be tested and a
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property are signified by ’S’ and ’P’, respectively. CBMC generates a conjunction of ’S’
and negation of ’P’ (S ∧¬P) and checks for its satisfiability by passing it to an efficient SAT
solver. If the generated conjunction formula proves to hold true then a violation of property
occurs and a counterexample is provided by CBMC in that case. It should be noted that
bounded model checking can only suggest satisfiability of a property up to the specified
bound rather than the complete behavioral state-space of a model.
CBMC provides some set of functions [9] that are of relevance to the presented work
in this thesis. They are as follow:
1. CProverAssert(condition, string) is a CBMC assert function which generates an as-
sertion when the supplied condition evaluates to be false. Example: CProverAssert(
a==3, ”Property violated!” ); generates an assertion if variable ’a’ is not equal to 3
and prints the passed string in the counterexample output.
2. CProverAssume(condition) takes a condition over a variable in the program and
prunes the further exploration of state-space whenever during an exploration path the
condition evaluates to be false. Example: CProverAssume(a≥ 2&&a≤ 5); prunes
further state-space exploration along a path whenever variable ’a’ has a value not
between 2 and 5 (both 2 and 5 are inclusive).
3. nondet int(), nondet double(), nondet char() are functions that generate random val-
ues with respect to the type of function used (return type is int for function non-
det int). They can be used to achieve better coverage on analysis by randomly as-
signing test values to intended input or dummy variables. Example: a = nondet int();
assigns a random value of type ’int’ to variable ’a’.
Adhering to object-oriented approach may lead to development of several .c and .h files
in any project. CBMC provides facility to create goto-binaries for multiple C files and
link them together into a single .exe goto binary by providing its own compiler and linker
41
executables [9]. Further, provisions of CBMC plugins for Eclipse IDE [2] and Microsoft’s
VisualStudio [12] allow convenient CBMC verification for a given C-based project.
The features of CBMC to model check large C programs against user specified asser-
tions and generation of random data values for better coverage analysis motivate its usage
in the work presented in this thesis.
III.9 NuSMV model checking tool
NuSMV [27] is an open-source model checker written in ANSI-C. It is able to perform
model checking on system models written in the NuSMV language. A system’s architecture
may be modeled in a modular fashion in the NuSMV language. The interface definitions of
the written modules facilitate a fine communication mechanism between them. The parser
in NuSMV reads files defining system models. The compiler in NuSMV then converts the
parsed model into BDD [23] representations containing boolean formulae translated from
the model descriptions. This enables NuSMV to perform efficient model checking by con-
structing and manipulating Finite State Machines (FSMs) at BDD level. NuSMV features
an interactive textual shell and a graphical user interface. NuSMV facilitates the manipu-
lation of FSMs at BDD level by providing options for choosing values of variables inter-
actively at every step during symbolic simulation of models. Alternatively, it may assign
random values to the variables by itself. NuSMV checks semantics, for example, circular
dependencies between different modules, after parsing the models from files. LTL-based
model checking is performed with NuSMV based upon the properties which are specified
as LTL formulae over the variables representing different states of a system. If the model
checking procedure concludes any property violations of the properties, NuSMV provides
counterexample traces to aid in debugging. NuSMV uses state-of-the-art tableau construc-
tion methods for LTL model checking that are described in Section III.6.3. NuSMV pro-
vides the Bounded Model Checking method to check for violation of a property up to a
certain bound. These features motivate NuSMV’s use in this research work.
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III.10 SPOT Library
Spot Produces Our Traces (SPOT) [35] library is an object-oriented C++ library providing
functions that facilitate verification tasks. Due to the useful features of TGBA, as dis-
cussed in Section III.6.3, SPOT developers chose to rely upon it. The rich set of model
checking functions provided by the SPOT library makes it a good candidate for integration
into verification tools. The Python bindings provided for SPOT also make it a favorable
candidate when a tool’s development framework comprises of Python code. But, Python
bindings were of no concern during our implementation work as the tools presented in this
thesis were developed using C++. The emptiness checking and LTL translation algorithms
from Couvreur [32], [33] are implemented in SPOT. In this thesis, our interest lies only in
converting LTL formulae to TGBA and hence we are concerned only with LTL translation
algorithms provided in SPOT, and not emptiness checking algorithm. The two LTL trans-
lation algorithms in [35] are termed as ’SPOT/FM’ [35] and ’SPOT/LaCIM’; the former
generates compact equivalent automata, while the latter is not intended to generate compact
automata. This motivates the use of ’SPOT/FM’ in implementation presented in this thesis.
SPOT provides a minimalist interface to an abstract class that contains TGBA structure.
Some appealing features of this interface are - (1) easy extraction of initial state of a SPOT-
generated TGBA by the function ’get init state()’. (2) iterator based traversal technique
to read all states and transitions of a TGBA by function ’succ iter()’. (3) understandable
sequence of error log statements printed on a tools console in cases when TGBA generation
fails. These features further motivate our use of the SPOT library in this work. The abstract
diagram in Fig. III.16 depicts the usage of SPOT for verification purposes in this work.
III.11 Google CTemplate
Google CTemplate [3] is a template-based approach to separate computation of data from
its presentation while output is being generated from any tool. As opposed to implement-
ing application logic in a tool to compute data with correct presentation, separating relevant
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Figure III.16: Abstract workflow for Verification tool using SPOT
variable data computations belonging to repetitive output code helps in minimizing appli-
cation logic that needs to be implemented. Further, it allows us to avoid any change in
application logic due to slight modifications in the presentations of desired output. This
feature is facilitated by Google CTemplate programming by using templates that contain
the generic presentation structures of desired output and annotating them with dictionary
markers to later fill in the computed data wherever necessary. Hence, an application is
required to contain only the implementation logic to compute variable data for filling in
templates. An example of a simple template is given below:
1 {{#ENTRY}} {{EMPLOYEE_NAME}} has a salary of {{SALARY_AMOUNT}} U.S.
Dollars.
2 {{/ENTRY}}
In the template given above, a section dictionary with title ’ENTRY’ contains two tag
names - ’EMPLOYEE NAME’ and ’SALARY AMOUNT’. Given below is a C++ pro-
gram that can be associated with the above template to compute data:
1 #include <stdlib.h>
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2 #include <string>
3 #include <iostream>
4 #include <ctemplate/template.h>
5 int main(int argc, char** argv)
6 {
7 ctemplate::TemplateDictionary dict( template");
8 ctemplate::TemplateDictionary* entryDict = dict->
AddSectionDictionary( E N T R Y );
9 entryDict.SetValue( EMPLOYEE_NAME", Akshay Agrawal");
10 entryDict.SetValue( SALARY_AMOUNT", 2 0 0 0 ");
11 std::string output;
12 ctemplate::ExpandTemplate( template.tpl", ctemplate::DO_NOT_STRIP
, &dict, &output);
13 std::cout << output;
14 return 0;
15 }
According to the program given above, every time a section dictionary is added to the
TemplateDictionary object ’dict’ by using function ’AddSectionDictionary()’, a new entry
for an employee is printed in the output from the template.
CTemplate has appealing use-cases in development of extension toolset for model-
based design tools. An intuitive example could be the following scenario - suppose a tool
automatically generates a program which contains function calls for several components
in a system. Now, while calling a function in a programming language it is imperative
to pass correct input variables, which in this case maybe the name of interface ports of a
component. In such a scenario, parameters for the function calls of multiple components
having different names for their interface ports can be computed by implementing com-
ponent traversal logic in a tool and using a relevant presentation in the template such as:
"{{#CALL}} componentMain( {{PORTNAME}} ); {{/CALL}}".
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The above explained features of the CTemplate system motivate its use in the presented
work.
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CHAPTER IV
DESCRIPTION OF THE VERIFICATION TOOL CHAIN
As per the proposed solution in Chapter I, for integration of the verification workflow
shown in Fig. I.2 with the CyPhyML framework, interpreter tools in context of CyPhyML
and the VTC meta-model are implemented as extensions to GME to realize the proposed
implementation shown in Fig. I.3. These tools are packaged as a toolchain - the Verifica-
tion Tool Chain (VTC). In this chapter, a conceptual overview is provided along with the
architecture of VTC and description of the features and usage of its interpreter tools. The
next chapter shall contain an illustrative example to show the process of verification for
CyPhyML cyber-domain models using the implemented tools.
IV.1 Conceptual Overview
A conceptual overview of VTC is given in Fig. I.1. The cyber components in CyPhyML
(for which VTC is proposed) are Simulink/Stateflow models representing discrete-time
controllers that are translated to CyPhyML models (refer to Fig. III.8). Temporal verifica-
tion properties can be modeled for these cyber components in GME using VTC, which must
be linked to the cyber components under test. The whole verification setup is developed
in a CyPhyML TestBench. The verification properties can be modeled in three ways - (1)
using a set of English-like patterns for convenience, (2) directly writing LTL formulas for a
temporal property, 3) modeling a temporal property using an ω-automaton (refer to TGBA
in Section III.6.3). To support our research aim of proving correctness of translators, model
checking should be performed directly at the model level on cyber component models. To
achieve this, the NuSMV tool is used. It should be noted that no tools were developed for
automated verification with NuSMV and hence for conducting experiments models were
translated manually to NuSMV representations for their verification. To prove correctness
of translator tools, their generated code output needs to be verified against the same set of
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properties which are used during NuSMV verification. To achieve this, CBMC tool is used
for verification, and for providing input to CBMC, C code needs to be generated for all the
cyber components and the modeled verification properties that are contained in a developed
TestBench. To facilitate verification of generated C code, its structure is ensured to be such
that the code fragments corresponding to a modeled property act as observing monitors
for the output signals of the cyber components under test. CBMC can then symbolically
simulate the behavior of cyber components and the property monitors to check the status of
the monitors so as to prove or disprove the violation of properties. The later sections of this
chapter contain the descriptions of procedures for property modeling, C code generation
for verification, and the tools used to achieve the goal of verification.
IV.2 Architectural Overview
An architectural overview of VTC is given in Fig. IV.1. The two interpreter tools developed
under VTC are – Verification Property Converter (VPC) and CyPhyTB2Ccode Gen. The
two tools remain available to be invoked from within a TestBench. Any of the three types
of property models (Pattern-based, LTL statement or Automata) can be associated with the
component under test in the TestBench. The RangeGuarantee elements define a range on
the input signals of the component under test allowing the verification tools to symbolically
execute the behavior code of the component within that range. VPC generates a TGBA
property model from a pattern-based temporal property model or an LTL-based property
model. The CyPhyTB2Ccode Gen tool traverses the assembly of components under test
connected to the property model that it is invoked from, according to the causality order
of the components in the assembly. It then generates a verification-enabled C code file
containing execution call statements for the components and the observing monitor. This
file can then be readily fed to CBMC for verification at the code-level. The following
sections describe the features and usage of the tools in further depth.
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Figure IV.1: Architecture of VTC
IV.3 VTC meta-model
This section describes a meta-model for VTC that is developed in GME. This meta-model
facilitates modeling of temporal properties using a pattern-based approach, LTL formula
writing and an automaton-based approach. The idea behind the pattern-based approach is
to make property modeling for systems convenient for domain engineers who lack expertise
in temporal logic. Further, this model-based approach to property modeling allows for
easy association of verification properties with the system models to be tested from the
beginning of the development cycle. The meta-model for VTC is shown in Fig. IV.2. VTC
meta-model facilitates modeling three types of property blocks -
1. PatternBased Requirement - This type of modeling block uses intuitive English-like
patterns for modeling temporal logic. An example is shown in Fig. IV.3. This type
of property block has two menu-type attributes: PatternType and ScopeType. Pat-
ternType specifies behavior patterns while ScopeType specifies scope patterns. The
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Figure IV.2: Meta-model for VTC in GME
behavior patterns are used to describe temporal semantics over atomic propositions.
The current set of behavior patterns are given in Table IV.1. Currently, only two
atomic propositions are allowed to be defined in the property block as objects of the
Proposition meta class. A Proposition can be contained only in this type of property
block and it can have either of the two titles ’P’ or ’S’. The titles are used to associate
a Proposition object with the behavior pattern used in its parent pattern-based prop-
erty block. The condition attribute for a Proposition needs to have a conjunction or
disjunction of boolean predicates which are defined over the names of VTC Signal
ports. Of course, these variables must refer to the state of the component under test.
For example, to use behavior ’Immediate Response(P & S)’ two Proposition blocks
must be inserted within the property block, one with title ’P’ and other with title ’S’.
An example of a condition attribute for a Proposition can be: a==5 && b==6 || c≤8,
where a, b, c are names for VTC Signal ports representing the names of signals to be
tested.
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Behavior Pattern Semantics
Existence(P) ’P’ holds true
Absence(P) ’P’ does not hold true
Immediate Response(P & S) if ’P’ occurs at some time-step then ’S’ occurs in the next time-step after ’P’
Response(P & S) if ’P’ occurs at some time-step then ’S’ occurs in the future after ’P’
Precedence(P & S) ’S’ must have already occurred before ’P’ occurs at some time-step
Table IV.1: Semantics of Behavior Patterns for Temporal Property modeling in VTC
Figure IV.3: A Pattern-based property Example modeled using VTC meta-model
The scope patterns define the scope for which a chosen property behavior is valid.
The scopes for such a pattern are defined by inserting Event Trigger Condition type
blocks that represent atomic propositions with title being either ’R’ or ’Q’. The title
attribute is used to associate an Event Trigger Condition with the scope pattern de-
fined for its parent property block. The condition attribute for Event Trigger Condi-
tion is similar to that of Proposition. The semantics of different scope patterns are
given in Table IV.2.
2. LTLSPEC Requirement - This type of property block is used to write the LTL for-
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Scope Pattern Semantics
Globally A defined behavior must be true always
Before R A defined behavior must be true before occurrence of event ’R’
After Q A defined behavior must be true after occurrence of event ’Q’
Between Q and R A defined behavior must be true between occurrences of events ’Q’ and ’R’, in that order.
Uses strong until temporal operator (U).
After Q Until R Analogous to Between Q and R but Uses weak until temporal operator (W).
Table IV.2: Semantics of Scope Patterns for Temporal Property modeling in VTC
mula representing a temporal property directly as a string in the LTLSPEC attribute
of the block without making use of any patterns. The boolean predicates of atomic
propositions in an LTL formula must be defined over signal variables which are the
same as names of VTC Signal ports inserted in the property block.
3. PropertyTGBA Requirement - This type of property block is used to model a TGBA
that is equivalent to a temporal logic of a property. Figure IV.4 shows an example
of this type of property block. States of the TGBA are inserted as VTC State type
objects. A VTC State has three attributes: LabelName, InitialState, State Number.
A LabelName is a label string for the TGBA state. InitialState is a boolean variable
for specifying whether a TGBA state inserted is an initial state or not. State Number
must be unique within a TGBA.
Transitions between TGBA states are inserted as VTC Transition connections be-
tween Transition Condition ports in two different VTC States. A Transition Condi-
tion is contained inside a VTC State and its condition attribute contains the boolean
condition for which the transition can be true. The signal variables over which this
condition is defined must be the same as the names of VTC Signal ports contained
in the property block. A Transition Condition also has two other attributes: Accep-
tance Transition and Condition Acceptance. The Acceptance Transition is a boolean
attribute that defines whether a transition is an accepting transition of the TGBA or
not. Condition Acceptance is a string-based attribute and contains a condition for
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Figure IV.4: An automaton based (TGBA) property modeled using VTC meta-model
which the transition becomes accepting. An example of a Transition Condition de-
fined inside a VTC State is shown in Fig. IV.4.
This type of property block is defined with two attributes: Acceptance Condition
and No Acceptance sets. The Acceptance Condition attribute is a boolean attribute
and if it is false then it means that all the transitions of the TGBA are accepting
transitions otherwise if it is true then only a subset of all the transitions of the TGBA
are accepting. No Acceptance sets are the number of accepting transitions sets that
the TGBA contains.
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A PatternBased Requirement can have VTC BusPortInterface and VTC Signal type
ports. A VTC BusPortInterface type port is a collection of VTC SignalPort type port ob-
jects and signifies a named collection of signals rather than a single signal. A VTC BusPort
Interface inside a property block indicates that the block is receiving a collection of sig-
nals from another component under test in a CyPhyML TestBench via a CyPhyML Bus-
Port that represents a collection of multiple connection links. To indicate a connection of
a property block via a single signal with another component under test inside TestBench
a VTC Signal port can be used. The VTC BusPortInterfaceRef and VTC SignalPortRef
type objects refer to VTC BusPortInterface and VTC Signal type ports. This type of ref-
erencing scheme is used when a PatternBased Requirement is automatically converted to
LTLSPEC Requirement and PropertyTGBA Requirement blocks using Verification Prop-
erty Conversion Interpreter Tool (VPC). This conversion is described further in the next
section. An LTLSPEC Requirement and/or PropertyTGBA Requirement block, converted
using VPC, contains references to ports in the PatternBased Requirement block from which
they are converted. The VTC BusPortInterfaceRef and VTC SignalPortRef type objects are
only used during automated property block conversions. As an alternative to converting
from a PatternBased Requirement block, whenever LTLSPEC Requirement and/or Prop-
ertyTGBA Requirement blocks are developed from scratch, VTC BusPortInterface and VT-
C Signal type ports can be inserted to receive signals directly from components under test
in a TestBench. A RequirementParameter type object inside a property block is used to
define variables that are not signals received by ports in a property block but are used in
boolean predicates in propositions for Proposition and Event Trigger Condition attributes.
All the three types of property blocks can be inserted inside a CyPhyML TestBench
where they can be connected to other components that need to be verified. Figure IV.5
shows a meta-model that depicts the VTC property block containment and connection re-
lationships within a TestBench. A MapToVTC Signal connection represents the connection
of the monitor specification to an OutputSignalPort of the component under test; a Bus-
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Figure IV.5: Meta-model for integration of VTC with CyPhyML TestBench
Port MapToVTC Signal connection represents the connection of the monitor specification
to a BusPort of the component under test. For the purpose of verification of a compo-
nent with the use of VTC and CBMC, InputRangeGuarantee type objects are associated
with InputSignalPort type ports of a component under test to define a range on the compo-
nent’s input signals. The two attributes, Maximum and Minimum, of InputRangeGuarantee
specify the minimum and maximum values for an input signal. These values are used to
generate CProverAssume() (refer to Section III.8) statements for CBMC verification. To
define ranges for input signals that are collectively presented by a BusPort of a component,
a RangeGuarantee Container BusPort can be used which can contain one or more Inpu-
tRangeGuarantee objects/blocks. Figure IV.6 shows an example of a TestBench constructed
for CBMC verification using meta-models described above.
IV.4 Pattern-based property to equivalent TGBA to C code monitor translation
Verification Property Converter (VPC) is the interpreter tool of VTC that converts a TGBA
from a pattern-based temporal property or an LTL formula. VPC is developed in C++ using
the object-oriented API for CyPhyML and VTC meta-models using UDM [56]. VPC trans-
lates the transitions of the TGBA into a set of if-else statements (refer to Fig. III.12). Figure
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Figure IV.6: Example of a CyPhyML TestBench constructed using the VTC meta-model
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Figure IV.7: Working for Verification Property Conversion (VPC) Tool
IV.7 shows the usage for VPC. Figure IV.3 shows the icon for VPC tool in GME. Dur-
ing the conversion of a PatternBased Requirement to a PropertyTGBA Requirement using
VPC, an LTLSPEC Requirement is generated as an intermediate result. All the VTC Signal
and VTC BusPortInterface ports contained in the property block are converted to their cor-
responding reference ports, i.e. VTC SignalPort Ref and VTC BusPortInterface Ref, re-
spectively, in the generated property blocks by VPC. This allows domain engineers to first
conveniently model a property using patterns and then invoke VPC on it to generate the
property’s equivalent LTL formula and TGBA to further modify the properties if needed
or use them as is. To convert a pattern-based property to an LTL formula VPC uses map-
pings encoded within it which are implemented from [7]. The LTL mappings for different
combinations of behavior and scope patterns are given in Table IV.3. VPC then uses the
mapped LTL formula as input to the SPOT/FM function (provided within SPOT library)
for LTL to TGBA conversion to produce a fine TGBA structure as a result. The TGBA
structure resulting from SPOT/FM function is traversed in a Breadth-first-search fashion
using its iterators provided within SPOT library to generate a PropertyTGBA Requirement
block.
IV.5 Generation of verification facilitated C code files from TestBench
C code representing behavior of cyber components in CyPhyML is generated using the Cy-
Phy2SLC CodeGen interpreter tool (the GME icon for this tool is shown in Fig. IV.3). Cy-
Phy2SLC CodeGen generates .c and .h type of source code and header files for a Simulink/
Stateflow model of a cyber component in CyPhyML. The generated code provides initial-
ization and main execution functions for the cyber components. For the purpose of verifica-
57
Behavior Pattern Scope Pattern Mapped LTL Formula
Existence(P) Globally G ”p”
Before R !”r” W ( ”p” & !”r” )
After Q G( !”q” | (”q” & F”p”))
Between Q and R G( ( ”q” & !”r” )( !”r” W ( ”p” & !”r” ) ) )
After Q Until R G( ”q” & !”r”( !”r” U ( ”p” & !”r” ) ) )
Absence(P) Globally G !”p”
Before R F ”r”( !”p” U ”r” )
After Q G( ”q”G(!”p”) )
Between Q and R G( ( ”q” & !”r” & F”r” )( !”p” U ”r” ) )
After Q Until R G( ”q” & !”r”( !”p” W ”r” ) )
Immediate Response(P, S) Globally G ( ”p”X ”s” )
Before R F”r”( ”p”X ( ”s” & !”r” ) U ”r”)
After Q G( ”q”G( ”p”X”s” ) )
Between Q and R G( ( ”q” & !”r” & F”r” )( ”p”X( ”s” & !”r” ) ) U ”r” )
After Q Until R G( ”q” & !”r”( ( ”p”X( ”s” & !”r” ) ) W ”r” ) )
Response(P, S) Globally G ( ”p”F ”s” )
Before R F”r”( ”p”( !”r” U ( ”s” & !”r” ) ) ) U ”r”
After Q G( ”q”G( ”p”F”s” )
Between Q and R G( ( ”q” & !”r” & F”r” )( ”p”( !”r” U ( ”s” & !”r” ) ) ) U ”r” )
After Q Until R G( ”q” & !”r”( ( ”p”( !”r” U ( ”s” & !”r” ) ) ) W ”r” ) )
Precedence(P, S) Globally !”p” W ”s”
Before R F”r”( !”p” U (”s” | ”r” ) )
After Q G( !”q”) | F(”q” & ( !”p” W ”s” ))
Between Q and R G( ( ”q” & !”r” & F”r” )( !”p” U ( ”s” | ”r” ) ) )
After Q Until R G( ”q” & !”r”( !”p” W ( ”s” | ”r” ) ) )
Table IV.3: Mappings between VTC Property Patterns and LTL formulae
tion of a component a verification wrapper file is generated by the CyPhyTB2Ccode Verification
interpreter tool in an automated fashion, wherein an observing monitor (C code frag-
ment for a property) is integrated with the execution calls of the cyber components in
the TestBench. This enables the monitor to investigate the output signals of the compo-
nent under test. Like VPC, CyPhyTB2Ccode Verification is also developed in C++ using
the API for VTC and CyPhyML meta-models (the API is generated using UDM). Cy-
PhyTB2Ccode Verification uses Google CTemplate file for template based C code genera-
tion. The template used for wrapper file generation is given below:
1 // Header Declarations
2 #include <stdio.h>
3 {{#HEADER_FILE}}#include "{{FILE}}"
4 {{/HEADER_FILE}}
5
6 #define bool int
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7 #define true 1
8 #define false 0
9
10 // Structure for the TGBA Automaton
11 {{TGBA_CODE}}
12
13 // Main function
14 int main(void)
15 {
16 // Variable Declarations : Type Double ; Name: Port/
RequirementParameter/InSignalRangeGuarantee names
17 {{#VAR_DECL}}double {{VAR_NAME}} {{#INIT_ZERO}} = 0 {{/INIT_ZERO}};
18 {{/VAR_DECL}}
19
20 // Declarig Contexts for all the TopLevel Subsystems inside all
found SignalFlowModels
21 {{#SUBSYS_CONTEXT_OBJECT}}{{SFTOPLEVELSUBSYS_NAME}}_context {{
SFTOPLEVELSUBSYS_NAME}}_context_Object;
22 {{/SUBSYS_CONTEXT_OBJECT}}
23
24 // Initializing the Signal Flow Models by initializing their
Toplevel Subsystems
25 {{#SUBSYS_INIT_CALL}}{{SFTOPLEVELSUBSYS_NAME}}_init(&{{
SFTOPLEVELSUBSYS_NAME}}_context_Object);
26 {{/SUBSYS_INIT_CALL}}
27
28 while(1)
29 {
30 // Declaring Assumptions for CBMC Verification
31 {{#ASSUME}}{{ASSUME_VALUE}} = nondet_double();
32 __CPROVER_assume({{ASSUME_VALUE}}>={{LOW_VALUE}} && {{
ASSUME_VALUE}}<={{HIGH_VALUE}});
33 {{/ASSUME}}
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34
35
36 // Execution Calls to Toplevel Subsystems
37 {{#SUBSYS_MAIN_CALL}}{{CALL}};
38 {{/SUBSYS_MAIN_CALL}}
39
40 printf("OUTPUT---- {{#VAR_DECL}} {{VAR_NAME}}: %4.2f,{{/VAR_DECL
}}"{{#VAR_DECL}}, {{VAR_NAME}}{{/VAR_DECL}});
41
42 // Verification TGBA Automaton Observe Call
43 {{OBSERVE_CALL}}
44 }
45
46 // Verification TGBA Acceptance check - For eventuality definig
properties.
47 {{ACCEPTANCE_CALL}}
48
49 return 0;
50 }
In the template given above, lines 1-4 are used to print the header file names for all the
cyber components in TestBench. A C code structure for an observing monitor is printed in
the wrapper file using the template tag in line 9. The generation of the monitor’s C code
structure is explained later in this section. The main function in line 11 becomes the entry
point for CBMC symbolic simulation, if no other specific function is stated to be an entry
point while using CBMC (CBMC can check explicit functions if the function’s identifier
is provided to it, otherwise it treats the main function as an entry point). Line 14 is used
to print variable declarations for input and output signals (names of interface ports) of all
cyber components in the TestBench. Line 22 is used to print the initialization functions for
all the cyber components in the TestBench, which is necessary before calling their main
execution functions. In line 25, an infinite while loop is used to indicate an infinite number
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of execution cycles for the cyber components under test. To enable only a finite number
of executions for cyber components, this while loop can be manually modified to a for
loop. Line 29 is used to print CBMC-compatible assume statements (refer to Chapter II
for CBMC assume functions) for input signal variables of the cyber components that are
assigned random test values for guiding the execution of the cyber components. Assume
statements are only printed for the input signal variables of interface ports which are associ-
ated with InputRangeGuarantee type objects in the TestBench. The random values for these
variables are generated using CBMC’s random value generator function (refer to Chapter
II) as given in line 28. Line 34 is used to print the main execution function calls of the cyber
components in the TestBench. These functions are provided input and output variables as
parameters. The values of output variables change as per the behavioral logic of the main
execution functions. Line 40 is used to print the observe function calls of observing mon-
itors. The functions are passed a set of input variables as parameters for the output signal
variables of the cyber components composed within the system under test. The variables
represent the state of the system under test and are checked after every single execution
cycle of all the cyber components within the system. This enables monitoring based ver-
ification. The acceptance function calls of the monitors are printed using line 44. The
descriptions of monitor’s observe and acceptance calls are discussed with the description
of observing monitor’s C code generation in the next paragraph.
The observing monitors are C code translations of TGBA equivalents of temporal prop-
erties. As discussed in Section IV.4, the TGBA equivalent (PropertyTGBA Requirement
for a modeled PatternBased Requirement or LTLSPEC Requirement property block can be
generated using VPC. The VPC-generated TGBA property block is translated to C code
by CyPhyTB2Ccode Verification tool. To perform this translation another CTemplate file
is used that is given below:
1 struct {{SPEC_NAME}}
2 {
61
3 bool accepting_observer;
4 bool accepted;
5 int state;
6 } {{SPEC_NAME}}_obj={{{ACC_OBS}}, false, {{INIT_STATE}}};
7
8 void {{SPEC_NAME}}_observe(struct {{SPEC_NAME}} *specobj{{#SIGNAL}},
double {{SIGNAL_NAME}}{{/SIGNAL}})
9 {
10 printf("OUTPUT---------TGBA state: %d", specobj->state);
11
12 {{#REQUIREMENT_PARAMETERS}}double {{RP_NAME}} = {{RP_VALUE}};{{/
REQUIREMENT_PARAMETERS}}
13 specobj->accepted = false;
14 {{#TRANSITION}}
15 // STATE_{{CURR_STATE}} ----{{CONDITION}}----> STATE_{{NEW_STATE
}}
16 if ( (specobj->state=={{CURR_STATE}}) && {{CONDITION}} )
17 {
18 specobj->state = {{NEW_STATE}};
19 {{#ACCEPTANCE_TRANSITION}}specobj->accepted = true;{{/
ACCEPTANCE_TRANSITION}}
20 }
21 else{{/TRANSITION}}{{#OBSERVE_ASSERT}}
22 {
23 __CPROVER_assert(0,"{{SPEC_NAME}} violated!");
24 }{{/OBSERVE_ASSERT}}
25 }
26
27 void {{SPEC_NAME}}_acceptance_check(struct {{SPEC_NAME}} *specobj)
28 {
29 if (specobj->accepting_observer == true)
30 {
31 if(specobj->accepted == false)
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32 {
33 __CPROVER_assert(0,"{{SPEC_NAME}} violated!");
34 }
35 }
36 }
In lines 1-6 of the template give above, a C structure is defined for a TGBA-based
observing monitor. The C structure for a TGBA has three member variables: accept-
ing observer, accepted, state. The member variable accepting observer is a boolean vari-
able which when is TRUE signifies that the TGBA has only a subset of accepting transi-
tions, and when is FALSE then signifies that all are accepting transitions (refer to Chapter
II and Fig. III.11). The member variable accepted is a boolean variable which is checked
in the acceptance check call (as in lines 24-34) whenever a TGBA has only a subset of
transitions as accepting ones. The member variable state specifies the current state of a
TGBA during an execution cycle and is used in the conditions of if-else statements in the
monitor’s observe call (as in lines 7-23). As described in Chapter II, a TGBA can be rep-
resented by a set of if-else statements which are based upon the transitions of the given
TGBA (refer to FiFig.reffig:CcodeTGBAEx1). The set of if-else statements in a moni-
tor’s observer call represent the transitions of the TGBA. The assert functions in lines 21
and 31 are used as property violation assertion statements. These assert statements are
used as user-based assertions by CBMC for checking violation of the given property. If
these assert statements are reachable during symbolic execution of CBMC then it proves
violation of the given property, otherwise it disproves any such violation within the loop
unwinding bound analyzed by CBMC. Examples of C code generation for a TGBA by Cy-
PhyTB2Ccode Verification can be seen in the illustrative examples that are discussed later
in this chapter.
CyPhyTB2Ccode Verification is invoked from within a property block. Once invoked it
generates the verification-enabled C code file as follows:
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1. If the interpreter tool is invoked from within a PatternBased Requirement or a LTL-
SPEC Requirement block then it searches for its equivalent PropertyTGBA Require-
ment block within the same CyPhyML TestBench. The name of the equivalent Prop-
ertyTGBA Requirement block is composed of the source property block’s name and
an augmented string ” TGBA”. For example, to search for an equivalent Proper-
tyTGBA Requirement for a source property block with name ’Prop1’, the interpreter
searches for a PropertyTGBA Requirement block with name ’Prop1 TGBA’ within
the same TestBench. This step is not performed by the interpreter if it is invoked from
within a PropertyTGBA Requirement block.
2. The interpreter generates the C code for the TGBA modeled inside the PropertyT-
GBA Requirement that is found above.
3. The interpreter traverses the components in given TestBench that are connected to
the property block. Every MapToVTC connection type connection for a property
block’s interface ports (or ports referenced by property block’s VTC SignalPort Ref
and VTC BusPortInterface Ref type objects) are traversed in the reverse direction in
a Breadth-first-search fashion. If two components A and B are connected to each
other such that output of A drives the input for B in the model, then according to
the concept of causality relationships for input stimulations of different components
that are connected to each other, A must be executed before B to provide meaning-
ful input to B. Hence, a reverse Breadth-first-search traversal approach is used to
make sure that the sequence of main execution functions of cyber components in the
TestBench printed in the wrapper file adheres to the causality relationships between
interconnected components. Currently for use of the CyPhyTB2Ccode Verification
tool, it is assumed that the graph of interconnected cyber components in a TestBench
has no cycles, as there is no mechanism developed to resolve cyclic dependencies be-
tween the components within a CyPhyML TestBench for C code generation to enable
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verification with CBMC.
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CHAPTER V
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
V.1 Ignition Model
In this section a Simulink/Stateflow model is discussed as an experimental example. The
Stateflow given in Fig. V.1 is a model of Ignition Logic controller of a vehicle which
controls the ignition light on the dashboard of the vehicle and controls the starter of the
vehicle based on a signal from the ignition key and the running status of the engine of the
vehicle. Table V.1 gives the description of the I/O signals and variables used in the model.
The expected behavior of the controller is as follows: when the ignition key is turned on
while the engine is not running, the starter should be engaged so as to start the engine and
be disengaged once the engine has started. The ignition light on the dashboard must reflect
the status of the engine at all times correctly.
This model was imported to the CyPhyML environment in GME using MDL2MGA, the
Simulink import utility, and its behavioral C code was synthesized using CyPhy2SLC Code-
Gen. Using VTC, a few temporal properties were modeled in GME and were linked to the
CyPhyML wrapper component which contained the imported model. For every property a
separate CyPhyML Testbench was prepared and C code verification files for CBMC were
Signal Name: Data Type Type of Signal Value Range Description
key pos: integer or double Input [0, 2] Signifies position for ignition key.
0 - key off, 1 - key on (electrical system turned on),
2 - turn on engine
engine running: integer or double Input [0, 2] For status of engine.
0 - engine is off, 1 - engine is running
ignition signal: integer or double Output [0, 2] Status for ignition on dashboard of vehicle.
0 - engine off, 1 - engine running, 2 - engine is get-
ting started
engage starter: integer or double Output [0, 1] Status of starter.
0 - starter off, 1 - starter on
Table V.1: IO Signals description for Ignition Logic controller
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Figure V.1: Stateflow design for Ignition Logic controller
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Figure V.2: CyPhyML TestBench for verification of Ignition Logic controller in GME
generated by using VPC and CyPhyTB2Ccode Verification interpreter. Figure V.2 shows
the TestBench developed for property 1 (the details of the property are discussed later in this
section). In the given figure, IgnitionController is the CyPhyML component wrapper for
the Stateflow model and InputRangeGuarantee objects are defined for both input signals.
For key pos the range is specified to be [0, 2] and for engine running it is [0,1].
At the model level, NuSMV was used to perform verification of the same properties
that were intended to be checked by CBMC. Bounded model checking was performed
with both the verification tools, CBMC and NuSMV, with a bound of 30. The NuSMV
representation of the controller was written manually and is given in Appendix VII.1. As
only integer values are allowed in NuSMV’s modeling language, the non-integer values
were approximated to the closest relevant integer values.
Verification property modeling using patterns in VTC of three properties, their equiv-
alent LTL formulae and TGBA, and C code translations used for CBMC verification are
given in forthcoming sub-sections. The experimental results are summarized in the final
sub-section.
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Figure V.3: TGBA equivalent of Verification Property 1 2 of the Ignition Logic Controller
V.1.1 Property 1: States of the Engine and the Ignition Light
The first property to be verified was - ”the engine should be running before the ignition light
reflects that the engine is running”. The parameters for the pattern-based property block
modeled using VTC for this property and its equivalent LTL formula generated using VPC
is as follows:
PatternBased Requirement:
Behavior Pattern: Precedes(P & S) - S precedes P:
S: (engine running>=0.5),
P: (ignition signal==1.00)
Scope Pattern: Globally
LTLSPEC Requirment:
LTLSPEC: !"ignition signal==1.00" W "engine running>=0.5"
In NuSMV the weak until operator (W) is not valid and hence the above LTL formula
is re-written with strong until operator (U) for NuSMV as (using conversion given in [7]) -
!(Ignition Logic.ignition signal=1) U
((engine running=1) | G(!(Ignition Logic.ignition signal=1)))
The TGBA equivalent for the LTL formula for Property 1 is given in Fig. VII.1 where
all of the transitions are accepting transitions.
1 // STATE_1 ----((engine_running>=0.5))----> STATE_2
2 if ( (specobj->state==1) && ((engine_running>=0.5)) )
3 {
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4 specobj->state = 2;
5 }
6 else
7 // STATE_1 ----(!(ignition_signal==1.00) && !(engine_running>=0.5))
----> STATE_1
8 if ( (specobj->state==1) && (!(ignition_signal==1.00) && !(
engine_running>=0.5)) )
9 {
10 specobj->state = 1;
11
12 }
13 else
14 // STATE_2 ----(1)----> STATE_2
15 if ( (specobj->state==2) && (1) )
16 {
17 specobj->state = 2;
18 }
19 else
20 {
21 __CPROVER_assert(0,"engineON_PRECEDES_ignitionON_TGBA violated!");
22 }
The if-else statements generated by using VTC from the TGBA in Fig. VII.1 are given
in the above code snippet. State 1 is the initial state for the TGBA. The if-statement on
line 2 is specified with the condition on the transition from state 1 to state 2 in the TGBA.
When the condition is true the current state member of the TGBA object is set to state 2
from state 1. Line 7 shows the if-statement with condition on the self-looping transition
of state 1. When the condition becomes true then the state of the TGBA object doesn’t
change as shown in line 10. The self-looping transition’s condition on state 2 of the TGBA
is specified as if-statement on line 14. If none of these if-statements hold true at any point
during the symbolic execution of the code by CBMC, then the assert statement in the else-
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block on line 19 will be reached resulting in violation of the property. In the context of
Property 1 it can be seen that when the engine is not running and the ignition light remains
on then none of the transitions’ condition from state 1 can hold true resulting in violation.
This behavior of the automaton is desired as per the logic of the property.
1 // Initializing the Signal Flow Models by initializing their Toplevel
Subsystems
2 ignition_init(&ignition_context_Object);
3
4 while(1)
5 {
6 // Declaring Assumptions for CBMC Verification
7 engine_running = nondet_double();
8 __CPROVER_assume(engine_running>=0 && engine_running<=1);
9
10 key_position = nondet_double();
11 __CPROVER_assume(key_position>=0 && key_position<=2);
12
13 // Execution Calls to Toplevel Subsystems
14 ignition_main(&ignition_context_Object, key_position, engine_running,
&engage_starter, &ignition_signal);
15
16 printf("OUTPUT---- engage_starter: %4.2f, engine_running: %4.2f,
ignition_signal: %4.2f, key_position: %4.2f,", engage_starter,
engine_running, ignition_signal, key_position);
17
18 // Verification TGBA Automaton Observe Call
19 engineON_PRECEDES_ignitionON_TGBA_observe(&
engineON_PRECEDES_ignitionON_TGBA_obj, ignition_signal,
engine_running);
20 }
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The above code listing shows a snippet from the generated verification-enabled C code
wrapper file from the TestBench for Property 1 by the CyPhyTB2Ccode Verification tool.
The snippet is taken from the main function of the generated C file. Line 2 contains the
initialization call to the ignition controller model. The function is defined in a header file
specified in an include statement at the beginning of the generated file. The header file
is one of the generated file from the code-generator under test that is used for generating
the behavior C code for the controller model. Though line 4 contains an infinite while
loop, CBMC will only unwind it till the specified bound, which is 30 in this case. In lines
7 & 10 the input signals to the controller are assigned a random value. If the values are
not within the range as specified in the assume-statements in lines 8 & 11 then CBMC
will avoid unwinding the loop further during the current iteration and will reiterate through
the loop. The value range specified in the assume-statements comes from the values as
were specified in the InputRangeGuarantee atoms in the verification TestBench. Line 14
contains the execution call to the controller model to make it proceed to the next logical
time step. In the statement on line 19 a call to execute TGBA monitor is made where the
property is checked for violation during every iteration of the containing while loop. It
should be noted here that the possibility of generating same combinations of the values for
the randomly assigned variables always remains. To make sure that such situation does
not prevail, the output from CBMC was manually observed to check for the assignment of
all possible permutations and combinations of random values that were being assigned to
relevant variables. The complete generated file is given in Appendix VII.2.2 for reference.
After performing verification with NuSMV and CBMC, the results from both tools
proved satisfiability of the verification property.
V.1.2 Property 2: Constraint on the Starter’s Engage state
The second property for verification states - ”if the ignition key is turned on when the engine
is not running then the starter should be engaged next so as to start the engine”. Using
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Figure V.4: TGBA equivalent of Verification Property 2 of the Ignition Logic Controller
VTC, the property was modeled as follows:
PatternBased Requirement:
Behavior Pattern: Immediate Response(P & S) - S occurs next after P:
S: (engage starter==1.00)
P: (key position>1.00 && engine running<1.00)
Scope Pattern: Globally
LTLSPEC Requirment:
LTLSPEC: G ( "key position>1.00 && engine running<1.00" ->
X "engage starter==1.00" )
The LTL formula for property 2 used in NuSMV verification is:
G ( (key position>1 & engine running<1) ->
X (Ignition Logic.engage starter=1) )
The TGBA equivalent for the LTL formula for Property 2 is given in Fig. VII.2. The
generated C code wrapper file for CBMC verification is given in Appendix VII.3.
Verification with both NuSMV and CBMC resulted in violation of the property with
the following counterexample traces:
NuSMV Counter-Example:
-> State: 1.1 <-
key position = 2
engine running = 0
Ignition Logic.ignition signal = 0
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Ignition Logic.engage starter = 0
Ignition Logic.state = Off
-> State: 1.2 <-
key position = 1
engine running = 1
Ignition Logic.ignition signal = 2
Ignition Logic.state = Start
CBMC Counter-Example:
OUTPUT---- engage starter: 0.00, engine running: 1.00,
key position: 2.00,
OUTPUT---- engage starter: 0.00, engine running: 0.00,
key position: 2.00,
The NuSMV tool prints the values for only those variables in the counter-example trace
which get changed when entering into a new state. In the above counter-example trace
from NuSMV, it can be seen that during State 1.1 the ignition key’s position value and
the engine’s running state variables indicate that the ignition is turned to ON state when
the engine is not running. According to the description of Property 2 the starter should be
engaged in the next state, that is, the engage starter signal should get ’1’ assigned to it
in State 1.2. But, in the counter-example trace there is no information printed out on the
starter’s signal in State 1.2 indicating no change in the signal’s value from State 1.1. Thus,
the property is violated. The CBMC counter-example trace shown for the violation of the
property can be understood in the same manner from its two output statements.
V.1.3 Property 3: Transition of the Starter states
The third property for verification states - ”always whenever the ignition key is turned off
and the starter is on then next the starter should be disengaged”. Using VTC, the property
was modeled as follows:
74
Figure V.5: TGBA equivalent of Verification Property 3 of the Ignition Logic Controller
PatternBased Requirement:
Behavior Pattern: Immediate Response(P & S) - S occurs next after P:
S: (engage starter<1.00)
P: (key position<1.00 && engage starter>0.00)
Scope Pattern: Globally
LTLSPEC Requirment:
LTLSPEC: G ( "key position<1.00 && engage starter>0.00" ->
X "engage starter<1.00" )
The LTL formula for property 3 used in NuSMV verification is:
G ( (key position<1 & Ignition Logic.engage starter>0) ->
X (Ignition Logic.engage starter<1) )
The TGBA equivalent for the LTL formula for Property 3 is given in Fig. VII.3. The
generated C code wrapper file for CBMC verification is given in Appendix VII.4.
Verification with both NuSMV and CBMC resulted in violation of the property with
following counterexample traces:
NuSMV Counter-Example:
-> State: 1.1 <-
key position = 2
engine running = 0
Ignition Logic.ignition signal = 0
Ignition Logic.engage starter = 0
Ignition Logic.state = Off
-> State: 1.2 <-
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engine running = 1
Ignition Logic.ignition signal = 2
Ignition Logic.state = Start
-- Loop starts here
-> State: 1.3 <-
key position = 0
Ignition Logic.ignition signal = 1
Ignition Logic.engage starter = 1
Ignition Logic.state = On
-> State: 1.4 <-
CBMC Counter-Example:
OUTPUT---- engage starter: 0.00, engine running: 0.00,
ignition signal: 0.00, key position: 1.00,
OUTPUT---- engage starter: 0.00, engine running: 0.00,
ignition signal: 0.00, key position: 2.00,
OUTPUT---- engage starter: 0.00, engine running: 1.00,
ignition signal: 0.00, key position: 0.00,
OUTPUT---- engage starter: 0.00, engine running: 0.00,
ignition signal: 0.00, key position: 0.00,
OUTPUT---- engage starter: 0.00, engine running: 0.00,
ignition signal: 0.00, key position: 2.00,
OUTPUT---- engage starter: 1.00, engine running: 0.00,
ignition signal: 0.00, key position: 0.00,
OUTPUT---- engage starter: 1.00, engine running: 0.00,
ignition signal: 0.00, key position: 0.00,
The NuSMV tool prints the values for only those variables in the counter-example trace
which get changed when entering into a new state. In the above counter-example trace from
NuSMV, it can be seen that during State 1.3 the ignition key’s position value indicates that
the ignition is switched off. According to the description of Property 3 the starter should
be disengaged in the next state, that is, the engage starter signal should get ’0’ assigned to
it in State 1.4. But, in the counter-example trace there is no information printed out for the
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State 1.4 indicating no change in any variable’s value from State 1.3. Thus, the property is
violated. The CBMC counter-example trace shown for the violation of the property can be
understood in the same manner from its last two output statements where turning off the
ignition key doesn’t change the signal to the starter in the next step.
V.1.4 Experiment Results Summary
By performing verification of critical properties for the Ignition Logic controller we intend
to support correct code generation from the C code generator tool, CyPhy2SLC CodeGen,
for CyPhyML cyber models. As per the consistency in the results of NuSMV and CBMC
verification, as summarized in Table V.2, we are able to generate better trust on the transla-
tion by the code generator tool under test.
Verification Property NuSMV Verification CBMC Verification
Property 1 Not violated Not violated.Verification Time: 36.68 sec
Property 2 Violated Violated.Verification Time: 36.323 sec
Property 3 Violated Violated.Verification Time: 36.804 sec
Table V.2: Verification results for Ignition Logic controller
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSIONS
VI.1 Conclusions
The presented tool chain, Verification Tool Chain (VTC), is expected to reduce the efforts
of domain-specific design engineers and encourage to include verification procedures dur-
ing CPS development life cycles. The pattern-based modeling feature of the toolchain al-
lows use of English-like patterns to model complex temporal properties, and the automated
workflow makes the verification procedure less tedious. We do not claim that the patterns
to model verification properties in VTC are sufficient to model any complex temporal logic,
but, as mentioned by Dwyer et al. [36], [37], the captured patterns allow a major percent-
age of the verification properties in the industry to be modeled conveniently. Additionally,
the engineers who find it more intuitive to model properties as automata are provided with
the automata-based property modeling feature in VTC. Integration of developed interpreter
tools with GME and automation schemes for VTC enable quick and easy way of integra-
tion of verification schemes with development life-cycle for CPS. With the use of VTC,
major behavioral errors in the systems can be exposed early during development to benefit
from in the long run. Verification of functional behavior preservation during translation of
the synthesized code leads to trustable deployable code in-house-developed interpreter or
translator tools. Given the above factors, the overall cost and time for development is ex-
pected to reduce significantly. Automated property augmentation and propagation schemes
will enable different engineering teams working on a project easily adhere to the safety
requirements of systems and verify them during each and every phase of the development
life-cycle in a convenient and automated manner. The discussed impacts are shown in a
visual diagram in Fig. VI.1.
During the course of this research work, major lessons were learned regarding verifi-
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Figure VI.1: Research Impacts
cation of systems. First, we learned that integration of verification workflows with devel-
opment life cycles of CPS is difficult without domain-specific knowledge of the systems
and model-based design approach remains beneficial here. This is because, the domain-
specific knowledge in model-based design allows the interpreter tools to be more context-
aware which enables us to tackle system models in a much better way. Second, we realized
the limitations of bounded model checking. We performed bounded model checking with
CBMC and NuSMV, which proves absence of errors down to certain depths in the behav-
ioral state-spaces of the system models under test. This may lead to spurious examples.
Third, we realized the difficulty in using property monitors to verify asynchronous sys-
tem models. As a meaningful logical time step is hard to be defined for the asynchronous
systems we can not decide the sampling durations for the output signals from the models
to be observed by the monitors. This raises difficulty in using monitors in asynchronous
or distributed environments. Fourth, we learned that C code checking with CBMC is still
computationally cumbersome and large state-spaces of generated property monitors or sys-
tems under test leads CBMC to halt with insufficient memory for further computations.
The discussed lessons are presented as a visual diagram in Fig. VI.2.
Our approach is not directed towards providing a complete context-free proof of cor-
rectness of the code-generators. Nevertheless, establishing that the code-generators are
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Figure VI.2: Lessons learned during research
property-preserving while generating code for software components proves useful for de-
veloping trust on them during fast-paced CPS development life cycles.
VI.2 Future Work
Currently, verification with NuSMV is performed by manually translating Stateflow de-
signs to the NuSMV language. As a future work, it will be helpful to extend VTC meta-
model and its toolchain so as to perform translation of CyPhyML cyber models to NuSMV
in an automated manner. Also, as explained in Section VI.1 and Chapter V, the bounded
model checking approach used here doesn’t provide complete proof of a property. Rather,
it only proves a model or its generated code to satisfy a verification property only up to a
certain bound in the behavioral state-space. Hence, to avoid generation of spurious results,
in the future, it shall be helpful to develop reachability analysis tools for CyPhyML com-
ponents so that pre-mediated trustworthy bounds can be specified before the application of
bounded model checking.
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CHAPTER VII
APPENDIX
VII.1 NuSMV translation of Ignition Logic Controller
1 MODULE main ( )
2 VAR
3 k e y p o s i t i o n : {0 , 1 , 2} ;
4 e n g i n e r u n n i n g : {0 , 1} ;
5 I g n i t i o n Logic : s t a t e f l o w ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g , k e y p o s i t i o n ) ;
6
7 MODULE s t a t e f l o w ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g , k e y p o s i t i o n )
8 VAR
9 i g n i t i o n s i g n a l : {0 , 1 , 2} ;
10 e n g a g e s t a r t e r : {0 , 1} ;
11 s t a t e : {Off , S t a r t , On} ;
12
13 ASSIGN
14 i n i t ( i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ) := 0 ;
15 i n i t ( e n g a g e s t a r t e r ) := 0 ;
16 i n i t ( s t a t e ) := Off ;
17
18 n e x t ( s t a t e ) :=
19 case
20 s t a t e = Off & ( k e y p o s i t i o n > 1) & ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g < 1) : S t a r t ;
21 s t a t e = S t a r t & ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g = 1) : On ;
22 s t a t e = Off & ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g = 1) : On ;
23 s t a t e = On & ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g < 1) : Off ;
24 TRUE : s t a t e ;
25 e s a c ;
26
27 n e x t ( i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ) :=
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28 case
29 s t a t e = Off & ( k e y p o s i t i o n > 1) & ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g < 1) : 2 ;
30 s t a t e = Off & ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g = 1) : 1 ;
31 s t a t e = S t a r t & ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g = 1) : 1 ;
32 s t a t e = On & ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g < 1) : 0 ;
33 TRUE : i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ;
34 e s a c ;
35
36 n e x t ( e n g a g e s t a r t e r ) :=
37 case
38 s t a t e = On & ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g < 1) : 0 ;
39 s t a t e = S t a r t & ! ( ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g = 1) ) : 1 ;
40 TRUE : e n g a g e s t a r t e r ;
41 e s a c ;
VII.2 Property 1 of Ignition Logic Controller
VII.2.1 TGBA equivalent of Property
Figure VII.1: TGBA for Property 1 for Ignition Logic controller
VII.2.2 C code verification wrapper file
1 / / Header D e c l a r a t i o n s
2 # i n c l u d e <s t d i o . h>
3 # i n c l u d e ” i g n i t i o n s l . h ”
4
5 # d e f i n e boo l i n t
6 # d e f i n e t r u e 1
82
7 # d e f i n e f a l s e 0
8
9 / / S t r u c t u r e f o r t h e TGBA Automaton
10 s t r u c t engineON PRECEDES ignitionON TGBA
11 {
12 boo l a c c e p t i n g o b s e r v e r ;
13 boo l a c c e p t e d ;
14 i n t s t a t e ;
15 } engineON PRECEDES ignitionON TGBA obj ={ f a l s e , f a l s e , 1} ;
16
17 void engineON PRECEDES ignitionON TGBA observe ( s t r u c t
engineON PRECEDES ignitionON TGBA * s p e c o b j , double i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ,
double e n g i n e r u n n i n g )
18 {
19 p r i n t f ( ”OUTPUT−−−−−−−−−TGBA s t a t e : %d ” , s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ) ;
20
21 s p e c o b j−>a c c e p t e d = f a l s e ;
22
23 / / STATE 1 −−−−(( e n g i n e r u n n i n g >=0.5) )−−−−> STATE 2
24 i f ( ( s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ==1) && ( ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g >=0.5) ) )
25 {
26 s p e c o b j−>s t a t e = 2 ;
27 }
28 e l s e
29 / / STATE 1 −−−−(!( i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ==1.00) && ! ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g >=0.5) )−−−−>
STATE 1
30 i f ( ( s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ==1) && ( ! ( i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ==1 .00 ) && ! (
e n g i n e r u n n i n g >=0.5) ) )
31 {
32 s p e c o b j−>s t a t e = 1 ;
33
34 }
35 e l s e
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36 / / STATE 2 −−−−(1)−−−−> STATE 2
37 i f ( ( s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ==2) && ( 1 ) )
38 {
39 s p e c o b j−>s t a t e = 2 ;
40 }
41 e l s e
42 {
43 CPROVER assert ( 0 , ” engineON PRECEDES ignitionON TGBA v i o l a t e d ! ” ) ;
44 }
45 }
46
47 void engineON PRECEDES igni t ionON TGBA acceptance check ( s t r u c t
engineON PRECEDES ignitionON TGBA * s p e c o b j )
48 {
49 i f ( s p e c o b j−>a c c e p t i n g o b s e r v e r == t r u e )
50 {
51 i f ( s p e c o b j−>a c c e p t e d == f a l s e )
52 {
53 CPROVER assert ( 0 , ” engineON PRECEDES ignitionON TGBA v i o l a t e d ! ” ) ;
54 }
55 }
56 }
57
58 / / Main f u n c t i o n
59 i n t main ( void )
60 {
61 / / V a r i a b l e D e c l a r a t i o n s : Type Double ; Name : Por t / Requ i r emen tParame te r
/ I n S i g n a l R a n g e G u a r a n t e e names
62 double e n g a g e s t a r t e r ;
63 double e n g i n e r u n n i n g ;
64 double i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ;
65 double k e y p o s i t i o n ;
66
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67 / / D e c l a r i g C o n t e x t s f o r a l l t h e TopLeve l S u b s y s t e m s i n s i d e a l l f ound
S igna lF lowMode l s
68 i g n i t i o n c o n t e x t i g n i t i o n c o n t e x t O b j e c t ;
69
70 / / I n i t i a l i z i n g t h e S i g n a l Flow Models by i n i t i a l i z i n g t h e i r T o p l e v e l
S u b s y s t e m s
71 i g n i t i o n i n i t (& i g n i t i o n c o n t e x t O b j e c t ) ;
72
73 whi le ( 1 )
74 {
75 / / D e c l a r i n g A s s u m p t i o n s f o r CBMC V e r i f i c a t i o n
76 e n g i n e r u n n i n g = n o n d e t d o u b l e ( ) ;
77 CPROVER assume ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g >=0 && e n g i n e r u n n i n g <=1) ;
78
79 k e y p o s i t i o n = n o n d e t d o u b l e ( ) ;
80 CPROVER assume ( k e y p o s i t i o n >=0 && k e y p o s i t i o n <=2) ;
81
82 / / E x e c u t i o n C a l l s t o T o p l e v e l S u b s y s t e m s
83 i g n i t i o n m a i n (& i g n i t i o n c o n t e x t O b j e c t , k e y p o s i t i o n , e n g i n e r u n n i n g , &
e n g a g e s t a r t e r , &i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ) ;
84
85 p r i n t f ( ”OUTPUT−−−− e n g a g e s t a r t e r : %4.2 f , e n g i n e r u n n i n g : %4.2 f ,
i g n i t i o n s i g n a l : %4.2 f , k e y p o s i t i o n : %4.2 f , ” , e n g a g e s t a r t e r ,
e n g i n e r u n n i n g , i g n i t i o n s i g n a l , k e y p o s i t i o n ) ;
86
87 / / V e r i f i c a t i o n TGBA Automaton Observe C a l l
88 engineON PRECEDES ignitionON TGBA observe (&
engineON PRECEDES ignitionON TGBA obj , i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ,
e n g i n e r u n n i n g ) ;
89
90 }
91
85
92 / / V e r i f i c a t i o n TGBA A c c e p t a n c e check − For e v e n t u a l i t y d e f i n i g
p r o p e r t i e s .
93 engineON PRECEDES igni t ionON TGBA acceptance check (&
engineON PRECEDES ignitionON TGBA obj ) ;
94
95 re turn 0 ;
96 }
VII.3 Property 2 of Ignition Logic Controller
VII.3.1 TGBA equivalent of Property
Figure VII.2: TGBA for Property 2 for Ignition Logic controller
VII.3.2 C code verification wrapper file
1 / / Header D e c l a r a t i o n s
2 # i n c l u d e <s t d i o . h>
3 # i n c l u d e ” i g n i t i o n s l . h ”
4
5 # d e f i n e boo l i n t
6 # d e f i n e t r u e 1
7 # d e f i n e f a l s e 0
8
9 / / S t r u c t u r e f o r t h e TGBA Automaton
10 s t r u c t keyONengineOFF NEXTstarterON TGBA
11 {
12 boo l a c c e p t i n g o b s e r v e r ;
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13 boo l a c c e p t e d ;
14 i n t s t a t e ;
15 } keyONengineOFF NEXTstarterON TGBA obj ={ f a l s e , f a l s e , 1} ;
16
17 void keyONengineOFF NEXTstarterON TGBA observe ( s t r u c t
keyONengineOFF NEXTstarterON TGBA * s p e c o b j , double e n g a g e s t a r t e r ,
double e n g i n e r u n n i n g , double k e y p o s i t i o n )
18 {
19 p r i n t f ( ”OUTPUT−−−−−−−−−TGBA s t a t e : %d ” , s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ) ;
20 s p e c o b j−>a c c e p t e d = f a l s e ;
21
22 / / STATE 1 −−−−(1)−−−−> STATE 2
23 i f ( ( s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ==1) && ( 1 ) )
24 {
25 s p e c o b j−>s t a t e = 2 ;
26 }
27 e l s e
28 / / STATE 1 −−−−(!( k e y p o s i t i o n >1.00 && e n g i n e r u n n i n g <1.00) )−−−−>
STATE 1
29 i f ( ( s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ==1) && ( ! ( k e y p o s i t i o n >1.00 && e n g i n e r u n n i n g <1.00)
) )
30 {
31 s p e c o b j−>s t a t e = 1 ;
32 }
33 e l s e
34 / / STATE 2 −−−−(( e n g a g e s t a r t e r ==1.00) )−−−−> STATE 2
35 i f ( ( s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ==2) && ( ( e n g a g e s t a r t e r ==1 .00 ) ) )
36 {
37 s p e c o b j−>s t a t e = 2 ;
38 }
39 e l s e
40 / / STATE 2 −−−−(( e n g a g e s t a r t e r ==1.00) && ! ( k e y p o s i t i o n >1.00 &&
e n g i n e r u n n i n g <1.00) )−−−−> STATE 1
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41 i f ( ( s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ==2) && ( ( e n g a g e s t a r t e r ==1 .00 ) && ! ( k e y p o s i t i o n
>1.00 && e n g i n e r u n n i n g <1.00) ) )
42 {
43 s p e c o b j−>s t a t e = 1 ;
44
45 }
46 e l s e
47 {
48 CPROVER assert ( 0 , ” keyONengineOFF NEXTstarterON TGBA v i o l a t e d ! ” ) ;
49 }
50 }
51
52 void keyONengineOFF NEXTstar terON TGBA acceptance check ( s t r u c t
keyONengineOFF NEXTstarterON TGBA * s p e c o b j )
53 {
54 i f ( s p e c o b j−>a c c e p t i n g o b s e r v e r == t r u e )
55 {
56 i f ( s p e c o b j−>a c c e p t e d == f a l s e )
57 {
58 CPROVER assert ( 0 , ” keyONengineOFF NEXTstarterON TGBA v i o l a t e d ! ” ) ;
59 }
60 }
61 }
62
63 / / Main f u n c t i o n
64 i n t main ( void )
65 {
66 / / V a r i a b l e D e c l a r a t i o n s : Type Double ; Name : Por t / Requ i r emen tParame te r
/ I n S i g n a l R a n g e G u a r a n t e e names
67 double e n g a g e s t a r t e r ;
68 double e n g i n e r u n n i n g ;
69 double k e y p o s i t i o n ;
70 double i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ;
88
71
72 / / D e c l a r i g C o n t e x t s f o r a l l t h e TopLeve l S u b s y s t e m s i n s i d e a l l f ound
S igna lF lowMode l s
73 i g n i t i o n c o n t e x t i g n i t i o n c o n t e x t O b j e c t ;
74
75 / / I n i t i a l i z i n g t h e S i g n a l Flow Models by i n i t i a l i z i n g t h e i r T o p l e v e l
S u b s y s t e m s
76 i g n i t i o n i n i t (& i g n i t i o n c o n t e x t O b j e c t ) ;
77
78 whi le ( 1 )
79 {
80 / / D e c l a r i n g A s s u m p t i o n s f o r CBMC V e r i f i c a t i o n
81 k e y p o s i t i o n = n o n d e t d o u b l e ( ) ;
82 CPROVER assume ( k e y p o s i t i o n >=0 && k e y p o s i t i o n <=2) ;
83
84 e n g i n e r u n n i n g = n o n d e t d o u b l e ( ) ;
85 CPROVER assume ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g >=0 && e n g i n e r u n n i n g <=1) ;
86
87 / / E x e c u t i o n C a l l s t o T o p l e v e l S u b s y s t e m s
88 i g n i t i o n m a i n (& i g n i t i o n c o n t e x t O b j e c t , k e y p o s i t i o n , e n g i n e r u n n i n g , &
e n g a g e s t a r t e r , &i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ) ;
89
90 p r i n t f ( ”OUTPUT−−−− e n g a g e s t a r t e r : %4.2 f , e n g i n e r u n n i n g : %4.2 f ,
k e y p o s i t i o n : %4.2 f , ” , e n g a g e s t a r t e r , e n g i n e r u n n i n g , k e y p o s i t i o n )
;
91
92 / / V e r i f i c a t i o n TGBA Automaton Observe C a l l
93 keyONengineOFF NEXTstarterON TGBA observe (&
keyONengineOFF NEXTstarterON TGBA obj , e n g a g e s t a r t e r ,
e n g i n e r u n n i n g , k e y p o s i t i o n ) ;
94 }
95
89
96 / / V e r i f i c a t i o n TGBA A c c e p t a n c e check − For e v e n t u a l i t y d e f i n i g
p r o p e r t i e s .
97 keyONengineOFF NEXTstar terON TGBA acceptance check (&
keyONengineOFF NEXTstarterON TGBA obj ) ;
98
99 re turn 0 ;
100 }
VII.4 Property 3 of Ignition Logic Controller
VII.4.1 TGBA equivalent of Property
Figure VII.3: TGBA for Property 3 for Ignition Logic controller
VII.4.2 C code verification wrapper file
1 / / Header D e c l a r a t i o n s
2 # i n c l u d e <s t d i o . h>
3 # i n c l u d e ” i g n i t i o n s l . h ”
4
5 # d e f i n e boo l i n t
6 # d e f i n e t r u e 1
7 # d e f i n e f a l s e 0
8
9 / / S t r u c t u r e f o r t h e TGBA Automaton
10 s t r u c t GLOBALLYkeyOFFstarterOnNEXTstarterOFF TGBA
11 {
12 boo l a c c e p t i n g o b s e r v e r ;
13 boo l a c c e p t e d ;
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14 i n t s t a t e ;
15 } GLOBALLYkeyOFFstarterOnNEXTstarterOFF TGBA obj={ f a l s e , f a l s e , 1} ;
16
17 void GLOBALLYkeyOFFstarterOnNEXTstarterOFF TGBA observe ( s t r u c t
GLOBALLYkeyOFFstarterOnNEXTstarterOFF TGBA * s p e c o b j , double
e n g a g e s t a r t e r , double k e y p o s i t i o n )
18 {
19 p r i n t f ( ”OUTPUT−−−−−−−−−TGBA s t a t e : %d ” , s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ) ;
20 s p e c o b j−>a c c e p t e d = f a l s e ;
21
22 / / STATE 1 −−−−(!( k e y p o s i t i o n <1.00 && e n g a g e s t a r t e r >0.00) )−−−−>
STATE 1
23 i f ( ( s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ==1) && ( ! ( k e y p o s i t i o n <1.00 && e n g a g e s t a r t e r >0.00)
) )
24 {
25 s p e c o b j−>s t a t e = 1 ;
26
27 }
28 e l s e
29 / / STATE 1 −−−−(( k e y p o s i t i o n <1.00 && e n g a g e s t a r t e r >0.00) )−−−−> STATE 2
30 i f ( ( s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ==1) && ( ( k e y p o s i t i o n <1.00 && e n g a g e s t a r t e r >0.00) )
)
31 {
32 s p e c o b j−>s t a t e = 2 ;
33
34 }
35 e l s e
36 / / STATE 2 −−−−(( e n g a g e s t a r t e r <1.00) && ! ( k e y p o s i t i o n <1.00 &&
e n g a g e s t a r t e r >0.00) )−−−−> STATE 1
37 i f ( ( s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ==2) && ( ( e n g a g e s t a r t e r <1.00) && ! ( k e y p o s i t i o n
<1.00 && e n g a g e s t a r t e r >0.00) ) )
38 {
39 s p e c o b j−>s t a t e = 1 ;
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40
41 }
42 e l s e
43 / / STATE 2 −−−−(( e n g a g e s t a r t e r <1.00) && ( k e y p o s i t i o n <1.00 &&
e n g a g e s t a r t e r >0.00) )−−−−> STATE 2
44 i f ( ( s p e c o b j−>s t a t e ==2) && ( ( e n g a g e s t a r t e r <1.00) && ( k e y p o s i t i o n <1.00
&& e n g a g e s t a r t e r >0.00) ) )
45 {
46 s p e c o b j−>s t a t e = 2 ;
47
48 }
49 e l s e
50 {
51 CPROVER assert ( 0 , ” GLOBALLYkeyOFFstarterOnNEXTstarterOFF TGBA v i o l a t e d !
” ) ;
52 }
53 }
54
55 void GLOBALLYkeyOFFstarterOnNEXTstarterOFF TGBA acceptance check ( s t r u c t
GLOBALLYkeyOFFstarterOnNEXTstarterOFF TGBA * s p e c o b j )
56 {
57 i f ( s p e c o b j−>a c c e p t i n g o b s e r v e r == t r u e )
58 {
59 i f ( s p e c o b j−>a c c e p t e d == f a l s e )
60 {
61 CPROVER assert ( 0 , ” GLOBALLYkeyOFFstarterOnNEXTstarterOFF TGBA v i o l a t e d !
” ) ;
62 }
63 }
64 }
65
66 / / Main f u n c t i o n
67 i n t main ( void )
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68 {
69 / / V a r i a b l e D e c l a r a t i o n s : Type Double ; Name : Por t / Requ i r emen tParame te r
/ I n S i g n a l R a n g e G u a r a n t e e names
70 double e n g a g e s t a r t e r ;
71 double e n g i n e r u n n i n g ;
72 double i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ;
73 double k e y p o s i t i o n ;
74
75 / / D e c l a r i g C o n t e x t s f o r a l l t h e TopLeve l S u b s y s t e m s i n s i d e a l l f ound
S igna lF lowMode l s
76 i g n i t i o n c o n t e x t i g n i t i o n c o n t e x t O b j e c t ;
77
78 / / I n i t i a l i z i n g t h e S i g n a l Flow Models by i n i t i a l i z i n g t h e i r T o p l e v e l
S u b s y s t e m s
79 i g n i t i o n i n i t (& i g n i t i o n c o n t e x t O b j e c t ) ;
80
81 whi le ( 1 )
82 {
83 / / D e c l a r i n g A s s u m p t i o n s f o r CBMC V e r i f i c a t i o n
84 e n g i n e r u n n i n g = n o n d e t d o u b l e ( ) ;
85 CPROVER assume ( e n g i n e r u n n i n g >=0 && e n g i n e r u n n i n g <=1) ;
86
87 k e y p o s i t i o n = n o n d e t d o u b l e ( ) ;
88 CPROVER assume ( k e y p o s i t i o n >=0 && k e y p o s i t i o n <=2) ;
89
90 / / E x e c u t i o n C a l l s t o T o p l e v e l S u b s y s t e m s
91 i g n i t i o n m a i n (& i g n i t i o n c o n t e x t O b j e c t , k e y p o s i t i o n , e n g i n e r u n n i n g , &
e n g a g e s t a r t e r , &i g n i t i o n s i g n a l ) ;
92
93 p r i n t f ( ”OUTPUT−−−− e n g a g e s t a r t e r : %4.2 f , e n g i n e r u n n i n g : %4.2 f ,
i g n i t i o n s i g n a l : %4.2 f , k e y p o s i t i o n : %4.2 f , ” , e n g a g e s t a r t e r ,
e n g i n e r u n n i n g , i g n i t i o n s i g n a l , k e y p o s i t i o n ) ;
94
93
95 / / V e r i f i c a t i o n TGBA Automaton Observe C a l l
96 GLOBALLYkeyOFFstarterOnNEXTstarterOFF TGBA observe(&
GLOBALLYkeyOFFstarterOnNEXTstarterOFF TGBA obj , e n g a g e s t a r t e r ,
k e y p o s i t i o n ) ;
97 }
98
99 / / V e r i f i c a t i o n TGBA A c c e p t a n c e check − For e v e n t u a l i t y d e f i n i g
p r o p e r t i e s .
100 GLOBALLYkeyOFFstarterOnNEXTstarterOFF TGBA acceptance check (&
GLOBALLYkeyOFFstarterOnNEXTstarterOFF TGBA obj ) ;
101
102 re turn 0 ;
103 }
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